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This study aims to measure and understand the changes in corruption that occurred due to United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption implementations to answer the effectiveness of the convention. The study 
explains the importance of corruption and gives a summary of UNCAC implementations. Event study is 
used to capture the adjustments in the quality of the governance. The study estimates the changes in all 128 
countries and separately in continents which gives the idea of in which types of countries UNCAC is 
effective. The empirical study is made with four different regressions, using four different corruption 
measures. The dependent variables are corruption from WB, Bayesian Corruption Index (BCI), public sector 
corrupt exchanges, and judicial corruption. Considering 128 countries, except BCI, dependent variables 
imply a decrease in the year that policies were implemented. Overall result for all countries, the convention 
is deemed to be successful. The continent base estimations suggest some statistically significant decline in 
corruption, Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, and the Middle East. If the UN focuses on these continents 
for future conventions, it might reach better outcomes. The result in Asia indicates an improvement in 
corruption; the UN might provide assistance instead of including the Asian countries in the conventions. 
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Corruption is a criminal offense that most legal systems are familiar with. The World Bank defines 
corruption as the abuse of public power for the private benefit1. Corruption harms trust, weakens democracy, 
disrupts economic development, and increases inequality in society. In the public sector, it takes the form 
of bribery, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, trading in influence, and abuse of functions. The effect of 
corruption has been long discussed among economists; Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) suggest through 
avoiding the bureaucratic delay and improving the work done by the officials, corruption is expected to raise 
the growth. However, most economists believe that efficient government institutions enhance economic 
growth (Mauro, 1995). Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) indicate empirical evidence that promoting the 
quality of governance and institutions stimulates economic growth. In his paper on corruption's impact on 
economic growth, Mauro used a sizeable cross-sectional sample, and his results proved the negative impact 
of corruption. Different empirical studies present a negative relationship with economic development, such 
as Abed and Davoodi (2000), Gründler and Potrafke (2019), D’Agostino and Dunne (2016). Corruption 
widens inequality and poverty, and not even a single country has a perfect corruption index score (Brody et 
al., 2020). Corruption is found in developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries, and to eliminate 
this global problem, governments and organizations created anti-corruption law implementation. The 
increase in the awareness of corruption with agencies improves anti-corruption precautions (Brody et al., 
2020). 
 
This paper focuses on the impacts of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on 
corruption. One hundred eighty-seven countries ratify this convention. Corruption has been an essential 
topic in the UN for two decades; meetings, studies, and activities are encouraged to solve the corruption 
problem. UNCAC was endorsed by UN General Assembly in October 2003 and entered force in December 
2005, and it is the first global agreement to curb corruption. However, not all countries endorsed and put 
the convention in force at the same time. The convention aims to improve the anti-corruption mechanism 
by promoting policies to detect and eliminate corruption (Rajesh Babu, 2006). The UN defines the common 
corruption types in four categories: grand corruption, petty corruption, passive, and active corruption 
(Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011). Grand corruption is called corruption that involves high-ranking officials. Petty 
corruption is defined as minor abuse of power. Passive corruption describes the situation when an official 
accepts a bribe. Active corruption describes the case when an official promises a bribe. 
 
Event study is used as the methodology to capture the changes that arise due to policy implementation. This 
method is a part of the difference-in-difference family; however, the never-treated group is defined 
 
1 World Bank, "Helping Countries Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank," 1997 
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differently from the diff-in-diff method, which is advantageous in this study. The purpose of this paper to 
answer whether this type of globally agreed conventions improve governance quality or not. The next 
question that this paper tries to answer is if conventions are successful in which type of continents there is 
improvement and which ones have more significant progress. These questions will provide an idea of in 
which countries the organizations like the UN might keep implying this type of convention and focus on 
those regions more to improve these conventions instead of focusing on the countries that show no 
improvement. The study suggests which countries need to promote different strategies to fight against 
corruption. 
 
The dataset includes quality of governance indicators for 128 countries between 1984 and 2018. The 
estimation is made with four different corruption data: Corruption Index, Bayesian Corruption Index (BCI), 
Public Sector Corrupt Exchange, and Judicial Corruption. The outcomes are divided into two parts; the first 
part of the results analyzes the influence of the convention jointly for 128 countries, and the second part 
implies results by political continents. The result provides intuitive information on the convention's positive 
impact when the policy is implemented in the estimation of 128 countries simultaneously, except BCI. The 
second section of the outcomes represents significant results for Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the 
Middle East, and Asia. At the same time, alterations in corruption are seemed to be different for each 
continent. 
 
This study is divided into three sections: the first section explains why corruption is important, the 
convention and policies, and literature review, the second section includes the data, the methodology, results 
of the estimations, and robustness check, the third section includes the conclusion. 
Section-I 
2. Why is corruption important? 
Corruption is harmful to the economy and harmful to social and political development (Brody et al., 2020). 
It changes the effectiveness of government expenditure due to misallocation of the public resources by 
embezzling and looting for personal benefit (Mauro 1995). The cost of corruption within a year is estimated 
to be more than 5% of the global GDP, which is $2.6 trillion (UN, 2009); the UN estimated that $1 trillion 
in bribes are paid each year. The European countries are less corrupt compared to the rest of the world2; 
therefore, the cost of corruption is relatively more minor. The EU estimated that the Union loses 1% of EU-
GDP each year, approximately €120 billion (Stefanuc, 2011). Corruption is causing a deceleration in 
catching up with the power of African countries. If Tanzania had the corruption level of Britain, its GDP 
 
2 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
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would be 20% higher than it is (Nikolić, 2011). Lambsdorff (2003) proved that a one-unit increase in 
corruption reduces GDP by 4% and lowers annual capital inflows by 0,5% of GDP. Dreher and Herzfeld 
found an improvement in corruption reduces GDP per capita by $435. In India, the rapid economic growth 
attracts attention and the corruption problem within the country (Global Integrity Report, 2009). According 
to a report published by Transparency International (2008), 22,728 households that are living below the 
poverty line paid $212million bribe to have basic need public service. The Telecommunication Ministry 
was involved with a $14 billion Telecommunication 2G auction scam; the ministry has listed 2nd most 
abusive power in all times (Time, 2011). Nigerian head of state laundered money in the US banking system, 
and after 22 years, the country is still trying to recover from this terrible governance decision (Sanni, 2020). 
The abuse of power harms not only the current economy but also the future economy. 
 
Corrupt actions cause harm to the public sector by decreasing the trust and efficiency in the government. 
Both India and Nigeria are emerging economies; even though the countries are improving their economy, 
the citizens of these countries do not trust their government due to their corrupt governance of the public 
funds (Brody et al., 2020). The ineffective use of tax revenues due to corruption in Nigeria pushes people 
to illegal business markets by causing a desultory power supply, lousy infrastructure, inadequate medical 
service, insecurity, poverty, low level of job opportunities, and high level of school dropouts (Awojobi, 
2014). In West Africa, the common corruption type in the public sector is seen as ghost names in payrolls 
(Atuobi, 2007). Ghana’s Auditor-General reported in 2002, approximately 2000 ghost names have paid $20 
million for two years, which caused forgone wealth in the public sector. The government in Mexico used 
the relief funds of small debtors (Friedland, 1998). The misallocation of the source might appear in the 
private or public sector; either way, it interrupts efficient economic activity and increases inequality. This 
disruption might be more adverse in the case of emerging countries due to scarce resources. 
  
The revenue of the Middle Eastern governments highly depends on the taxation of the hydrocarbon sector; 
however, oil isn’t unlimited. Therefore, countries that rely on oil or gas are developing alternative ways to 
increase government revenues to keep sustainability in the future (Imam, 2007). To solve the revenue 
problem, the government will need to increase the taxes to compensate for the revenue decrease from the 
oil sector. Therefore, a complex tax system and higher tax rates are expected to be used as a solution that 
will generate a rise in corruption levels. Eventually, this increase in corruption will cause a further decrease 
in government revenues (Imam, 2007). The countries that experience relatively lower corruption have an 
additional income of 4% of GDP in tax revenues3. The decrease in corruption between 2003 and 2008 in 
 
3 IMFBlog. 2019. Corruption and Your Money. [online] Available at: <https://blogs.imf.org/2019/05/28/corruption-and-your-money/>  
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Rwanda raised the tax revenues by 6% of GDP; the fight against corruption in Georgia increased the tax 
revenues by 13% of GDP4. 
 
Transparency International (2011) reports that in Latin America, Chile and Uruguay relatively have 
experienced less corruption, yet this does not mean the existing markets are clean. In 1994, IBM workers in 
Argentina paid a $37 million bribe to get a $250 million computer system from Banco de la Nación (Mills, 
1998). The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa states that in 2004, the continent lost more 
than $148 billion to corruption, approximately 25% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The report 
highlights that poor governance, lack of accountability and transparency, low level of democratic culture 
and tradition, deficiency in citizen participation, lack of clear regulations, low level of institutional control, 
extreme poverty, and inequality might cause more corruption. To eliminate the forgone money, 
policymakers try to develop anti-corruption policies, but does this policy implementation work? The impact 
of anti-corruption activities differs among countries since developing countries are more likely to be 
politically manipulated (Vadlamannati, 2015). Organizations like the United Nations Development 
Program, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank provide advice and guidance to countries 
that suffer from corruption. The biggest problem with the advice and guidance is that the cause of corruption 
and how it affects the system differs among countries, and these organizations provide a general guide for 
each country. However, the guide can give an initial point to start to fight against corruption. The World 
Bank’s report suggested that to have a successful anti-corruption implementation, and it is complicated to 
find an appropriate entry point for anti-corruption work (Rothstein, 2011). 
 
3. United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the only legally binding universal anti-
corruption instrument5. The General Assembly established an ad hoc committee in 2000 to negotiate legal 
tools against corruption (UNCAC, 2003); in 2003, the General Assembly adopted the treaty, and in 2005, 
the UNCAC was put into force by the UN. Purpose of the convention: (a) To promote and strengthen 
measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively; (b) To promote, facilitate and 
support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, 
including in asset recovery; (c) To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public 
affairs and public property (UNCAC, 2003). Not all implementation has the same level of obligation to 
bring into force. The legislation could be defined as mandatory or optional. Each Member State who signed 
the treaty has to implement or incorporate the mandatory articles into the existing domestic legal system 
 
4 IMFBlog. 2019. Corruption and Your Money. [online] Available at: <https://blogs.imf.org/2019/05/28/corruption-and-your-money/> 
5 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ 
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(Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011). The UN established a UNCAC Coalition6 in 2006 as a global civil society 
network to urge monitoring, implementation, and ratification while providing technical support to member 
states in the light of UNCAC.  Prevention methodologies include both the private and public sectors, and 
these measures are effective when applied for the long term. Corruption is multifaceted; therefore, it requires 
extensive preventive measures (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011). In the absence of these types of measures, the 
implementation does not hamper criminal activity. 
 
The general provision chapter provides articles that state the purpose of the convention. These first articles 
display support for the ideology of integrity and accountability within all types of organizations, including 
the government. The second chapter implies the preventative measurements which improve transparency 
and accountability in the public sector and generates anti-corruption bodies. Article 5 mandates the Member 
States to apply effective preventive anti-corruption policies and practices; however, the article does not 
suggest specific legislation (UNCAC, 2003). The implementation aims to improve the confidence and 
accountability of the public sector. Accountability relies on fundamental principles of law; organization, 
functioning, and decision-making processes. 
 
The other aspect of the second chapter is promoting transparency. The transparency level of the country 
reports the information availability of the decision-making process to the public; any improvement increases 
the detection of corruption. Many economists suggest that information availability significantly impacts 
market failures and efficient resource allocation (Stiglitz, 2000). UNCAC implies improvement in 
transparency in public administration expediently to these fundamental principles. The importance of the 
information available to the public is related to corrupt public officials, and transparency eliminates the self-
gain exchanges (Lindstedt et al., 2010). Governments have a natural monopoly over the provision of many 
publicly procured goods and services, and a selfless and impartial government official would provide these 
services efficiently. However, the officials can be self-seeking; they might use their position for personal 
gain. The self-seeking attitude might harm the government’s trustworthiness. UNCAC takes precaution on 
justice which is expected to improve the accountability and transparency of the public sector. 
 
Corruption also threatens the quality of justice, and it generates opportunities for impartial trials. Justice has 
a vital role in the fight against corruption; thus, it must be well-functioning. Corruption undermines 
resolution, law enforcement, and property rights. The independence of the judiciary has a significant 





Preventative measures cover not only the public sector but also the private sector. The increasing 
privatization induces expansion in the private sector, and the line between the public and private sectors 
gets blurred. Due to similarities, anti-corruption implementations for the private sector are akin to the public 
sector. Corruption in the private sector, in the long run, creates inefficiency in the market, and it is more 
likely to cause distortions in small businesses (Rajesh Babu, 2006). 
 
The chapter on criminalization and law enforcement defines certain criminal offenses. Such as bribery and 
embezzlement. There are different ideas about what generates public corruption; therefore, it is complex to 
identify the crime uniformly. This implies that harmonization will be challenging to achieve; however, 
almost every definition uses bribery as a form of corruption (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011). UNCAC 
criminalizes bribery and other types of bribery-related crimes to capture a wide range of causes of 
corruption, such as embezzlement, illicit enrichment, trading in influence, and abuse of functions. The 
ideology behind the convention is to eliminate the opportunity of bribery, which will eliminate corruption7.  
 
The ideology behind the convention is to eliminate the opportunity of bribery, which will eliminate. The 
fourth chapter obligates the Member States to assist each other in the fight against corruption. Globalization 
allows offenders to move around the Member States; therefore, UNCAC implies having cooperation among 
countries to eliminate cross-border corruption. International cooperation is necessary to achieve prevention 
investigation, prosecution, punishment, recovery, and return of illicit gains8. The fifth chapter is about asset 
recovery, and this chapter carries significantly different importance for the developing countries since these 
countries are the ones that lost a more considerable amount of wealth on corruption.  Resource allocation is 
the major problem that the convention gave an entire chapter to recover the stolen assets and prevent this 
inefficiency from rising again. This chapter specifies a framework generated with civil law and criminal law 
to trace, freeze, forfeiting, and return assets9. The sixth chapter is devoted to technical assistance to 
developing countries and countries in transition. This assistance includes training, materials, human 
resources, research, and information sharing. 
 
4. Literature Review 
Corruption has been present throughout history in both the public sector and the private sector. Corruption 
distorts the development level that prevents countries from improving, and richer countries tend to corrupt 
less (Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003). Even most successful countries have suffered from corruption due to 
 
7 Gantz, supra note 98, at 480. 
8 Legislative Guide for Implementation Of the UNCAC (2006) 
9 United Nations Convention Against Corruption Wikipedia (2012) 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_Against_Corruption 
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governance failures in their early development stages (Khan, 2006). However, the governance capacity that 
they have achieved improved the transparency and accountability systems, which lead to better law 
enforcement and an increase in development. Researchers are developing anti-corruption policies to 
eliminate corruption in all different levels of developed countries. The developing and emerging countries 
have a hard time reducing the corruption level since it is challenging to implement the law against corruption 
because of a lack of incentives and resources (Khan et al., 2018). However, in some cases, these countries 
have to implement anti-corruption policies, i.e., to get reelected or, in this case, pressure from the UN. 
  
The impact of anti-corruption policies inconclusive in the African continent since the outcome of the policies 
differs among the countries. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption is a legal framework that 
aims to combat corruption of government officials by criminalizing domestic and transnational bribery. The 
policy was implemented on March 29, 1996. This convention had a slight negative impact on the corruption 
level of Jamaica, Honduras, Trinidad & Tobago, and Guatemala, and the impact of the convention 
disappeared after 2002 (Altamirano, 2007). Jamaica had the best CPI value amount the countries; however, 
it is one of the countries affected the least by the convention. After 2002 Jamaica experienced an increase 
in corruption and extensive media exposure of corrupt practices connected to the ruling People's National 
Party (Altamirano, 2007). Some countries that developed broad national anti-corruption policies or 
strategies, such as Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Zambia, were unsuccessful. 
(Hussmann, K. 2007). 
  
Developed countries, compared to African countries, are more likely to be part of organizations like OECD 
and EU, which have constant ongoing fight against corruption; the results of the battles depend on the 
governance style of the country. Like all the EU candidates and members, Romania and Bulgaria had 
corruption control, and the EU has a significant impact on the domestic changes in the candidate countries. 
These changes come with a cost, but generally, the benefits outweigh the costs (Grabbe, 2006). Romania 
and Bulgaria had the most negligible improvement among the post-communist countries; Romania’s 
institution-building generated a solid base to fight against corruption (Lacatus et al., 2020). Another example 
from Central-Eastern Europe can be Hungry. Hungry's controls to eliminate corruption with penalties do 
not show any improvement; the result of other CEE countries not expected to be better than Hungry 
(Batory,2012). However, more empirical research is needed to prove this expectation. In general, the EU 
implies effective anti-corruption policies. The effect of the anti-corruption law enforcement impact diverse 
among the countries. The involvement of international organizations such as UN agencies and the Council 
of Europe creates legal obligations more lasting; therefore, anti-corruption policies do not disappear (Batory, 
2010). 
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EU not only assists members of the Union; the organization tries to improve the transparency and 
accountability of the European continent. When it comes to a candidate and other countries in Europe, the 
organization has restricted power. The EU had an essential role in the structure of the anti-corruption laws 
in Turkey; the IMF supported these law implementations since it was overlapping their ideology on 
corruption. With a new government in 2002, several reforms were implemented to improve the public sector 
in Turkey. In 2010, the new strategies were implemented to fight against corruption, and these strategies 
changed the intuitionist structures whose purpose of this change was to preserve the power of the incumbent 
party (Soyaltin, 2017). The new institutions changed the public sector and supported corruption rather than 
eliminating it. International organizations, in this case, the EU, cannot prevent corruption; these kinds of 
domestic action might prevent the implementation of an external organization. The external organizations' 
impact can fall back since they cannot intervene with the domestic issues; therefore, the effectiveness of the 
implementations on corruption decreases. 
  
Countries from the different political continents have disparate outcomes from law enforcement; some of 
the differences can be explained by how policies are implemented, which affects the outcome of the policy 
implementation. A good example can be given from Sri Lanka. The implementation was a web-based 
transparency approach to the publication of financial statements and included long-term consultants for 
departmental staff (Chandrasena 2008). The implementation had a positive impact and more support from 
staff (Heeks et al., 2012). In Indonesia, after the 1998 crisis, there were five waves of reforms to improve 
politics, economics, and bureaucracy (Primanto et al., 2014). These reforms during the last two decades 
created a successful political foundation with a clean government. Davis (2004) works with empirical 
analysis of the policy implementation on corruption, increase in the cost of corruption, and improvement in 
accountability and transparency effective decrease in corruption in India and Pakistan. Besides how the law 
is enforced, who implements the law is another important question. Vyas (2020), in his paper, analysis 
different styles of anti-corruption strategies and collected evidence on the effectiveness of two approaches 
from India and China with expert interviews. In one of the interviews, it is reported that the local 
governments are more likely to take action when the initiatives come from high authority through loose 
implantation (Vyas et al. 2020). 
  
Using only the law implementations might not be practical; therefore, the next step of enforcement, which 
includes monitoring, is essential as taking action. The programs that combine community monitoring and 
incentives are the most successful implementations, and these programs eliminate corruption by increasing 
the probability of being caught and increasing punishments (Hanna et al., 2011). Separately, the 
implementations might not decrease the corruption; without monitoring, the policies do not imply any 
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incentives with punishment, instead imply getting caught without penalty. Exclusively implying the 
incentives also isn’t efficient, without monitoring having punishment does not decrease the corruption. 
Uganda has taken several anti-corruption measures to eliminate corruption, including agencies. However, 
these implementations were not successful due to ineffective punishments to deter corruption, causing 
significant loss to the public (Gumisiriza et al., 2019). Media has a substantial impact on the effectiveness 
of policy implementation (Hanna et al., 2011); when people are aware of how corruption damages the 
economy, they will act against the incumbent in the elections. Therefore, the known programs are expected 
to decrease corruption effectively, and the officials will have an incentive to follow the law enforcement 
due to the threat of losing the seat (Brollo, 2009). In the elections, the media distributes detailed information 
about the campaign and is expected to have less corruption involved in elections. A monitoring program 
that implies more media interference in elections decreased the corruption in Brazil, the transfers made to 
corrupt officials declined (Brollo, 2009, Ferraz and Finan, 2008). This decline in corruption was found to 
be short-term. 
  
The institutions play a significant role in the law implementation process where the institutions provide the 
right economic policy, monitoring, and enforcement of the law. In Hong Kong, the highly powered 
institutions are responsible for implementing and evaluating anti-corruption policies (Gong et al.,2015). 
These institutions successfully decreased corruption (Cheung, 2008); their detection ability improves 
corruption prevention. However, the impact of the public institutions is not the same in each country; in 
African countries, the institutions do not have any significant impact (Aldcroft, 2015). In general, non-
governmental organizations significantly impact the implementation when altering the policies or 




Corruption data is taken from the World Bank, and the data assess the political system where the highest 
value is one which means the county does not suffer from corruption and the lowest is zero. The data is 
available between 1984-2018. This corruption data includes special payments and bribes related to export 
and import licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, and loans. However, the data’s 
measurement focuses on actual or potential corruption such as patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favor-
for-favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. Bayesian 
Corruption Indicator (BIC)10 is the second corruption index that is computed by Samuel Standaert. This data 
 
10 Samuel Standaert (2015) "Divining the Level of Corruption: a Bayesian State Space Approach", Journal of Comparative Economics, 43 (3) 
782-803. DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2014.05.007 
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is calculated with information from 17 different surveys and 110 different questions for each country 
globally, and it is available between 1984 -2017. The data gets the value between 0-100, where 100 means 
completely corrupt, and 0 means no corruption; this is the main difference of BIC compared to World Bank’s 
corruption data. Judicial Corruption Decision is data from World Bank. It is calculated with an expert survey 
question and country-specific information; the question is trying to analyze bribery to obtain a favorable 
judicial decision for personal gain. The variable can get values between 0 and 1, where one means the 
country does not experience any corruption. The data is available from 1974 to 2019.  Public sector corrupt 
exchange is calculated with an expert survey question that asks to what extent officials grant favors in 
exchanging a bribe. The variable gets the same values as Judicial Corruption Decision, and the data is 
available between 1975 and 2019. Corruption, public sector corrupt exchange, and judicial corruption are 
reversed for the convenience of the study. Therefore, 0 means the country does not experience any 
corruption. 
  
Clean Election data estimates to which extent the elections (national, representative political office) are free 
from the interaction of rules. The indicator used in the process of estimation of the data shows the quality 
of the elections. The data is taken from the World Bank database, and it gets a value between 0 and 1. Liberal 
Democracy Index11 identifies the importance of minority rights against the state's authoritarianism and 
majority. The variable answers the question to what extent liberal democracy is achieved with civil liberties, 
a strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and adequate checks and balances that, together, limit the 
exercise of executive power. The data gets 0 when there is no liberal democracy, and it gets the value of 1 
when democracy is entirely liberal. The unpredictability of the government might lead to loopholes for 
corruption in the public sector. Predictable Enforcement defines to which extent executive and public 
officials enforce laws predictably, and it is taken from the World Bank database. It is calculated with three 
expert coded V-Dem indicators: respect to the constitutional provision, the presence of transparent law, rule-
abidingness in the public sector. A separate data Transparency Index12 is estimated with the combined index 
of information transparency index and accountability transparency index. The data gets a value between 0-
100, where 100 implies complete transparency. Direct Democracy Index13 calculated by David Altman 
(2016), is used to capture citizen opinion effectiveness on corruption. Election Free and Fair14 variable is 
calculated with a survey question, and the question asks if the respondent thinks national elections are free. 
However, the free election might be achieved even if the law precludes a part of the society, and other 
democracy variables are expected to capture this inequality’s impact on governance. 
 
11 Coppedge et al. (2015, V-Dem Working Paper Series 2015:6) 
12 University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan21 
13 World Bank 
14 World Bank 
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Central Bank Independence15 is the weighted average of four different components. The independence index 
shows the level of government involvement with the central bank decision. High Court Independence is 
calculated with a survey question by World Bank, and the question focused on the judicial system where it 
is salient to the government. The survey asks how often the court grants the wishes of the government, 
disregarding the legal responsibility. The variable defines the autonomy level in the decision-making 
process; it shows if the outcome of the court is following the government’s opinion regardless of sincere 
view. The lowest value that the variable gets is 0, and the highest is 1. Judicial independence takes the value 
between 0 and 1, and the data is taken from the World Bank database. The variable identifies if the court is 
affected by the other branches of the government. Independent Judiciary16 is a dummy variable that gets one 
if there is an independent judiciary. 
  
A survey question estimates Legislature Investigation in Practice17, and the question identifies if an 
investigation results contrarily to an executive who engaged with corruptive activities. The data gets the 
value between 0 and 1. Economic Globalization18  is defined as both trade flows and financial flows. The 
indicator’s scale is from 0 to 100. Corruption Commission Present in the Constitution19 is a dummy variable 
where gets the value 1 when a country has provisions for an anti-corruption commission in the constitution, 
otherwise zero. 
  
State Fragility Index20  identifies to which extent a country can manage the conflict within the country; make 
and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system 
coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises and sustaining 
progressive development (Marshall, 2017). President Change is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
there is a presidential change during the year that the country signed and applied the convention and zero 
otherwise. The change in the president might affect the attitude of the government towards anti-corruption 
policies. The type of regime that countries might impact the legislation, which is applied, and on the 
corruption level: monarchy, military, civil war, and occupation are dummy variables that represent the 
regime type.21 The regime's stability is another crucial variable to build up good governance, and constant 
change might create an environment that is difficult to act against corruption. Regime durability shows the 
number of years passed since the recent regime change. 
 
15 University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan21 
16  University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan21 
17 World Bank 
18 University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan21 
19 University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan21 
20 University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan21 
21 University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogbasjan21 
 13 
  
In many regions globally, when there are more women in the government or the parliament, the countries 
experience less corruption (Jha and Sarangi, 2018). World Bank made a study in 2000 with 150 countries 
from different regions, and women increase the trustworthiness of the government. The proportion of seats 
held by women in national parliaments22 might explain the current corruption level. Gender inequality is 
correlated with corruption, and inequality undermines good governance (TI, 2014). The corruption level 
seems to lower when there is gender equality and countries pursue empowerment of women. Gender 
Equality23 identifies gender equality power distribution that is calculated gender and female participation in 
civil society organizations with; the ratio between female and male mean years of schooling, the proportion 
of lower chamber female legislators, and the proportion of women in ministerial-level positions. 
 
Media has a preventative impact on corruption, increases the probability of detection (Becker, 1974). The 
incumbent is less likely to abuse their power, in the case media might expose. The fear of exposure decreases 
the criminal exchanges in the public sector. Media Freedom24 is a dummy variable that gets 1 when there is 
free media, not controlled by the government, otherwise zero. Print/broadcast Censorship Effort25 is 
estimated by a survey question, and the question asks if the government directly or indirectly attempts to 
censor the print or broadcast media. The data gets the value between 0 and 1, and it gets values of 0 when 
government applies a censor. Media corruption data is from World Bank. The variable is another data that 
uses a survey for estimation; the equation is about if a publisher accepts payment to alter the news. 
 
Educated individuals are expected to have more information about the political institutions and are more 
willing to monitor the government’s movements. Apart from the increase in information about institutions, 
education also affects the participation of individuals. Citizens are more likely to get involved with politics 
and to act against corrupt officials when they are educated (Glaeser, 2006). The school enrollment rate10 
for primary school is expected to capture the mentioned impact of education. Empirical studies have proved 
that dependence on official aid is associated with an increase in corruption, and aids increase the rent-
seeking activities in the recipient country (Alesina and Weder, 2002). The effect of the aids might depend 
on the quality of governance (Kangoye, 2011), in developing countries, the aids do not improve 
development since it is consumed with misallocation. The ODA26 variable is expected to capture the impact 
of aids on corruption. 
 
 
22 World Bank 
23 World Bank 
24 World Bank 
25 World Bank 




Even though the empirical method is part of the Difference and Difference family, and empirical estimates 
can be plotted, graphs show the post-treatment effect without the assumption of pretreatment trend; the 
econometric interpretation is straightforward (Schmidheiny et al., 2020). Event study originated from 
finance; this method has been used to predict future stock market prices. Nowadays, the method is used in 
applied economics, in public and labor economics, where the effect of the policy is analyzed (Schmidheiny 
et al., 2020). This quasi-experimental method examines the impact of the significant event in specific time 
periods and specific units by comparing the changes that occur around the event's application to a baseline 
reference point (Clarke et al., 2020). Typically, the reference point is the first lag, and the lag is normalized 
to zero. Both event lags and leads are used to estimate to have a visual result of the event’s impact (Clarke 
et al., 2020). In this paper, the event study will provide information on whether the convention met the 
assumption of a decrease in corruption. The first step is to define the event window, and it expresses the 
period that is examined. The interval of the event window is represented with leads and lags; lags capture 
what happened in the past, and leads capture the effect that will happen in the future. The leads and lags are 
dummy variables that capture the short-term and medium-term abnormal returns. The event window has the 
trade-off between having a short or long estimation period; more significant length provides more precision; 
however, the estimation could be out of data (Basdas, 2014). In this study, the data includes 34 years from 
1984 to 2018. Units are i = 1, …, 128, where each unit represents a country; not all countries get the 
treatment simultaneously, but each country gets the treatment only one time. This study is influenced by the 
event study method of Clarke (2020), which provides intuitive information about the subject. The analysis 
is made both using whole data and the balanced version of the data. While estimating with all data available, 
I also used the specification of the untreated periods. The specification is accumulated at the endpoints; in 
this case, the endpoints are represented by grey color in the figures. The balanced data keeps only balanced 
information from the dataset into regression, and the endpoints use the same color as other time periods. 
 
7. Results 
The empirical analysis is made with four different dependent variables to capture changes in corruption. I 
proceed following tests before estimating event study; linearity, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, Breusch-
Pagan, Hausman test (see appendix). The first results imply unilinear regression; however, the outcome 
changes when I run event study regressions. None of the variables indicates multicollinearity subject to the 
VIF test. Autocorrelation show presence in some of the regression, to see which regressions have 
autocorrelation problem see appendix. Breusch-Pagan test indicates the necessity of the panel models, and 
the Hausman test implies fix effects is a consistent estimation. The changes in corruption are examined for 
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all countries together and by their political continents. The continents are Eastern Europe and the post-
Soviet Union, Latin America, North Africa, and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe, and 
North America, and Asia. However, Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union countries do not have enough 
observations to have enough statistical power. The expected outcome is to capture an improvement in the 
quality of governance with a decline in corruption. The expected result in continent base changes in the case 
of Western Europe and North America, the countries are more likely to a part of an organization. Therefore, 
the convention might not imply any new policy that might create a significant change in corruption. The 
influence of the UNCAC is unclear at t=2,3 since the convention's success for following time periods 
depends on the countries’ policy on monitoring which is not considered in the convention policies. The 
effectiveness of UNCAC Coalition’s impact on monitoring depends on the willingness of the member states. 
 
7.1 All Countries 
All regressions include a set of quality of governance variables and economic conditions with dummy 
variables to control the changes within the country. In addition, X is a vector of covariates; to see which 
variables are included, see Table-1 in Appendix.  
	
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" = 𝑋!"𝛽 + 𝜀               (1) 
 
Results of regression (1) are shown in Table -1 in Appendix and Figure-1. We can see a statistically 
significant outcome for government expenditure, coup, and past corruption levels (see appendix Table-1). 
In the case of the lagged value of corruption, the sign of the coefficient is positive, which means an 
improvement in corruptive activities in the past indicates an increase in corruption by 1.001 units. The 
positive signed coefficient on the government expenditure implies that an increase in government spending 
will enhance corruption. Coup is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country experience coup 
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in the corruption index by 0.0002 units. Change in government by force means that the new incumbent is 
not concerned with following the constitutional and democratic process (Marinov and Goeman, 2014). 
Subject to results, when the countries do not perform the democratic procedure to change the government, 
corruption rises. Figure-1 gives the visualized results of the UNCAC implementations on corruption for all 
countries in the dataset. At the time of implementation, corruption shows a fall, and this fall’s impact begins 
to fade away after t=0. However, the sign at t=1 still implies a decline in corruption. Among the lead and 
lags, the only statistically significant result is at t=0, considering 90% CI. Therefore, we can say that there 
is a decline in corruption in the year that the policy was implemented. 
 
The second dependent variable is BCI; the regression structure is the same as the previous regression since 
dependent variables are expected to be similar. X is a vector of covariates; to see which variables are 
included, see Table-2 in Appendix. 
𝐵𝐶𝐼!" = 𝑋!"𝛽 + 𝜀               (2) 
 
Results of regression (2) show the significant result for media corruption index, population, and government 
expenditure (see appendix Table-2). Media corruption and population have a positive sign; an improvement 
in the corruption activities in media enhances the corruption by 2.71 units. The literature presents ambiguous 
results on the effect of population rise. Economic theory suggests that economies of scale governance of 
larger countries have better law implementation and the effective rule of law. The negative effect of the 
population appears when the administrative cost increases with size, which reverts the effect of economies 
of scale governance (Chong, 2020). Regression (2) follows economic theory, and a rise in population 
reduces corruption. Government spending has a negative sign; therefore, a rise in government expenditure 
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regression that included all countries. Regression-2 indicates that the leads and lags that are not statistically 
significant. The balanced data does not change the outcome in the joint estimation of the countries. 
 
The third regression uses the public sector corrupt exchanges as a dependent variable. X is a vector of 
covariates; to see which variables are included, see Table-3 in Appendix. 
 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐	𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡	𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠!" = 𝑋!"𝛽 + 𝜀               (3) 
 
The results of regression (3) for All Countries provide information about the influence of economic 
conditions through GDP per capita and inflation (see appendix Table-3). Subject to regression (3), an 
increase in inflation enhances public sector corruption by 0.00009 units. When inflation generates a decline 
in income, individuals might tend to find alternative ways to increase their income, such as bribery (Akca 
et al., 2012). Even though the increase in corruption is not high, the results follow the literature on inflation’s 
impact on corruption. An improvement in the transparency index composes a decrease in corruption by 
0.0021 units. Transparency lowers the information barriers and allows detection of corruption27, therefore 
as the outcome implies, corruption will decrease. The expected result for the proportion of women in the 
parliament was to capture a decrease in public sector corruption with a rise in the proportion; however, the 
result shows the opposite. In the case of gender equality, improvement in gender improves the quality of 
governance by 0.188 units. Figure-3 represents a fall at t=0, which means a decline in corruption the year 
the policies started to be implemented. In the following years, the impact does not fade away; however, the 
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The dependent variable of the fourth regression is the judicial corruption decision, the structure of 
the regression similar to the previous regression. X is a vector of covariates; to see which variables 
are included, see Table-4 in Appendix. 
 
𝐽𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛!" = 𝑋!"𝛽 + 𝜀               (4) 
 
The fourth regression for All Countries implies that an improvement in both predictable enforcement and 
judicial independence decreases judicial corruption. In the case of predictable enforcement, the decrease is 
by 0.2272 units. An increase in judicial independence eliminates the limits on the court system (Gloppen, 
2013); therefore, independence reduces judicial corruption by 0.4028 units (see appendix Table-4). 
Additionally, an improvement in school enrollment also causes a decrease in judicial corruption. The FDI-
in shows a positive sign which means an increase in FDI that enters to country creates higher corruption. 
(Larraín and Tavares, 2004). Figure-4 (a) the fall at t=0 fades away in the following time period, and 
corruption increases. The graph with balanced data (b) indicates some changes, the increase in corruption 
t=1 is less, and this increase is not constant in the rest of the time periods. Nonetheless, the drop in t=0 
subject to the reference point has similar values in both graphs. 
The results imply that corruption declines the year convention is implemented, except for BCI. The impact 
of the policies in the following time periods does not indicate a significant result. The insignificant leads 
generate limitations on interpreting the impact of convention in the following years. Based on the literature, 
the expected result for the future is a decline in the positive impact of the convention in the absence of 
monitoring policies. The following segment is looking at the influence of the convention by political 
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Regression (1): Corruption 
 
The regression for Latin America yields a statistically significant result in past corruption, an increase in 
corruptive activities in the past raises the corruption by 0.99 units (see appendix Table-1). Hence, we can 
say that in Latin American, past corruption is correlated with future corruption. Legislature investigation 
indicates that questioning the activities of legislatures will recover the corruptive activities and make them 
take responsibility for their actions. An increase in the investigation of legislature decreases corruption. In 
Latin American countries, one unit improvement in past inflation reduces corruption. Figure-5 (a) presents 
a decline in corruption, and the impact of the policy implementation does not fade away swiftly. However, 
none of the lags and leads have statistically significant results. There is no statistically significant result for 
North Africa and the Middle East, except lagged corruption, which implies an increase in corruption. Graph 
(b) in Figure-5 shows a fall at t=0, and the impact does not fade away; nevertheless, all leads and lags are 
not statistically significant. 
 
In Sub-Saharan countries, lagged corruption yields result similar to previous ones: a decline in past 
corruption is associated with a reduction in present corruption. Judicial corruption has a negative coefficient 
which means a decrease in judicial corruption reduces corruption by 0. 0109 units (see appendix Table-1). 
An improvement in the quality of the election seems to improve the quality of governance (IofC 
International, 2021), decreases crime, therefore indicates a decrease in corruption by 0.0081 units (see 
appendix Table-1).  At t=0, policy changes imply a fall, but the impact fades away in the following periods. 
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Regression-1: North Africa & the Middle East
Figure-5
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significant results are direct democracy and judicial corruption (see appendix. Tabl-1). When judicial 
corruption declines, corruption decreases. An improvement in direct democracy reduces corruption since 
direct democracy implies government effectiveness and lowers corruption when citizens can express their 
opinions (Voigt, 2019). The results in Figure-6 (a) and (b) imply statistically insignificant leads and lags, 
however, when I run the regressions while using the balanced data, the results change. In Sub-Saharan 
countries, underbalanced data (c) shows a fall at t=0, which can be defined as a decrease in corruption 
considering 90% CI; in the following periods, the effect fades away. At t=2,3, the values are statistically 
significant, proving the impact of policy implementations fades away. In Western Europe, the balanced data 
graph in Figure-6 (d) shows only one statistically significant value at t=3 which does not provide any critical 
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Results for Asian countries show that inflation and lagged corruption value are significant (see appendix 
Table-1). The lagged corruption value has a positive coefficient, a rise in corruptive activities in the past 
indicates an improvement in corruption by 1.0005 units. An enhancement in inflation decreases corruption 
by 0.00007. Looking at Figure-7, there is not a significant change, and the only statistically significant result 
belongs to lead-3, which does not provide any important information. The estimation does not give 
significant results even in the case of balanced data. 
 
The continent-specific results indicate a decline in corruption for the Sub-Saharan continent with balanced 
data, and the convention has a positive impact on the quality of governance. The following time periods 
give essential information on what happens to convention’s impact in the future with statistically significant 
coefficients, the results indicate a decline in convention’s impact at time periods t=2 and t=3. The significant 
result in corruption appears only in Sub-Saharan countries. Therefore, we can say that the convention 
provides short-term solutions, and UNCAC Coalition's impact is inefficient to promote monitoring. 
  
Regression (2): Bayesian Corruption Index 
The regression (2) for Latin America gives statistically significant results for election, corruption 
commission, and GDP per capita (see appendix Table-2). An improvement in GDP per capita reduces 
corruption by 0.0002 units. When countries in Latin America get richer, the quality of governance improves. 
The presence of the election is represented by a dummy variable, and when the countries in Latin America 
face an election, corruption increases by 0.2105 units. The existence of a corruption commission is seemed 
to have a different impact than the expected one, when a country in Latin America has a corruption 
commission, the corruption increases by 1.1531 units. The expected result was to capture a decrease since 
control of commission is assumed to prevent corruptive activities. The graph of Latin America in Figure-8 
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statistically significant. In the case of North Africa and the Middle East, the dummy variable for coup shows 
that the existence of the coup increases the corruption by 1.2427 units (see appendix Table-2). The impact 
of increasing international trade is represented with economic globalization; an improvement in 
globalization reduces corruption by 0.0439 units. The reason behind this decline is explained by the 
requirement of international norms and rules (Koyuncu and Unver, 2017). Figure-8 for North Africa and 
the Middle East implies (b) a constant rise in corruption, and t=2 is statistically significant. This result 
implies that corruption increases after the political implementation.    
 
Results for Sub-Saharan countries suggest that the increase in predictability of enforcement is associated 
with a decline in corruption by 7.3457 units (see appendix Table-2). The impact of economic activities is 
represented by inflation, and a rise in inflation causes an improvement in corruption by 0.0141 units. The 
graph for Sub-Saharan countries in Figure-9 (a) implies a decrease in corruption, in the following time 
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Regression-2:West Europe and North America
Figure-9
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change with balanced data. In Western Europe and North America, the regression implies an enhancement 
in juridical independence induces a reduction in corruption by 16.0756 units (see appendix Table-2). 
Transparency of the public and private sector has a preventative measure; an increase in the transparency 
index lowers corruption. The graph of Western Europe in Figure-9 (b) implies a constant decrease in 
corruption after the policy implementations. 
 
In the regression of Asia (see appendix Table-2), the past corruption level is the only statistically significant 
parameter, and the coefficient has a positive sign which means an increase in past corruption level seems to 
generate an improvement in corruption, therefore, contagion matters. A reduction in judicial corruption 
indicates a decrease in corruption by 13.4038 units. An increase in both government expenditure and 
transparency has a negative sign which means a decline in corruption. Additionally, an increase in inflation 
causes a rise in corruption. Looking at Figure-10 in the year that policy was implemented, the corruption 
declines, however, this decrease wears off at t=1 and implies a statistically significant increase in corruption. 
Even though there is a decrease at t=2 compared to the previous time period, it is statistically insignificant. 
The last time period follows the path of t=1 and implies a higher increase in corruption, and also it is 
statistically significant considering 90% CI. 
The BCI indicates significant results for the Asian continent, the sign of the coefficient at t=1, which is the 
only statistically significant outcome, contradicts expected results. The convention is seemed to simulate 
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Regression (3): Public Sector Corrupt Exchange 
In Latin America, any increase in population causes a decline in corruption (see appendix Table-3). At t=0, 
the graph in Figure-11 (a) represents a rise which means the corruption increases. At t=0, the graph in 
Figure-11 (a) represents a rise which means the corruption increases, and this enhancement in corruption 
remains in the following time periods. In North Africa and the Middle East, an increase in inflation enhances 
corruptive activities (see appendix Table-3). Additionally, the transparency improvements imply a rise in 
the quality of governance. Looking at the graph for North Africa in Figure-11 (b), the results show a fall 
when policies were implemented, which is defined as a decline in corruption considering 90% CI. This 
reduction in corruption fades away at t=1, and it implies policies implement no change in corruption. The 
following time periods do not have statistically significant results. In the case of balanced data, the outcome 
does not have any significant results either. 
 
The result of regression-3 for Sub-Saharan indicates a statistically significant outcome in the case of 
predictable enforcement (see appendix Table-3). An improvement in the predictability of law enforcement 
decreases public sector corruption by 0.6494 units. The provision of the information without hiding any 
information is assumed to decrease the corruptive activities, which is the case for Sub-Saharan countries. 
An increase in transparency reduces corruption by 0.0030 units. An improvement in globalization enhances 
international trade and relations as well as the corruption in the public sector. The graph of Sub-Saharan in 
Figure-12 (a) countries implies a downwards movement in the year that policies were implemented 
considering 90% CI. The decrease in the corruptions remains in the following years. The regression of 
Western Europe implies statistically significant results only for media corruption, a reduction in media 
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The graph of Western Europe in Figure-12 (b) implies a constant decline after the political implementations. 
The existence of the corruption commission in Asian countries decreases corruption by 0.0686 units (see 
appendix Table-2). Also, an increase in predictability of the enforcements implies a decline in corruption 
by 1.20446 units. Figure-13 implies no improvement at t=0 and the other periods imply an increase in public 
sector corruption. 
 
The public sector corrupt exchange has a statistically significant outcome in both North Africa and the 
Middle East and Sub-Saharan continents. The convention indicates an improvement in the quality of 
governance by decreasing corruption. This is another dependent variable that the UNCAC seems to imply 
a decline in corruption for Sub-Saharan countries. The significant time period differs for the continents; the 
Sub-Saharan continent implies significant results in the year that policies were implemented (t=0). In the 
North African continent, the outcome is significant for the following year (t=1). The following time periods 
are not significant, the information is available is limited. Due to limitations, we can only say that the 
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Regression (4) Judicial Corruption 
An increase in state fragility in Latin America generates an improvement in corruption, this increase in 
corruption is also supported in the case of central bank independence, the independence increases the 
corruption by 0.0925 units (see appendix Table-4). The outcome of independence does not follow the 
expected results, which is improvement in the quality of governance. However, the independence of the 
judiciary has an opposite impact on corruption, the judicial corruption decreases by 0.4978 units. The result 
in Figure-14 (a) implies a decrease in corruption, however, the results are not statistically significant. The 
result in Figure-14 (c) uses balanced data, the result at t=1 indicates no changes after policy implementation. 
The results of North Africa show, education has a negative impact on corruptive activities, an improvement 
in school enrollment rate reduces judicial corruption by 0.0004 units (see appendix Table-4). Judicial 
independence has a similar result to Latin America when independence enhances the judicial corruption 
decreases by 0.0413 units. Economic globalization is significant, and an improvement causes a decline in 
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North Africa implies an increase in corruption at t=0. In Figure-14 (d), t=3 is the only significant time period 
that implies an increase in corruption. 
 
In Sub-Saharan countries, judicial independence again has a statistically significant impact on judicial 
corruption, an increase in independence generates a decline in corruption by 0. 3917 units (see appendix 
Table-4). Moreover, predictable enforcement has a negative influence on criminal activities; an 
improvement in predictability of enforced law decreases judicial corruption by 0.2708 units. When state 
fragility enhances, corruption increases by 0.0038units. Figure-15 (a) for Sub-Sahara countries does not 
significantly change in t=0, and the leads coefficient indicates an improvement in judicial corruption. 
Nonetheless, the results are not statistically significant. The result of balanced data (Figure-16 (a)) 
regression indicates that t=1 is statistically significant considering 90% CI, implying an increase in 
corruption after the political implications. The result of Western Europe shows only one statistically 
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Figure-15
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assumed outcome (see appendix Table-4). An improvement in free election increases judiciary corruption 
by .0446988 units. The graph in Figure-15 (b) suggests a decrease in corruption after the policy 
implantations, but the results are not statistically significant. This outcome does not change in the case of 
balance data (Figure-16 (b)), even though the graph’s shape changes. 
 
The regression of Asia implies statistically significant results for judicial independence and direct 
democracy (see appendix Table-4). The sign of independence is negative; any improvement in the 
independence of the judiciary is associated with a decrease in corruption by 0. 4132 units. Direct democracy 
has the opposite sign, and any improvement causes more judicial corruption. Figure-17 represents a fall at 
t=0, the decrease in corruption does not fade away at t=1. Nonetheless, these results are not statistically 
significant. 
 
The last dependent variable, judicial corruption, presents significant results in the Sub-Saharan continent 
while using balanced data. The only significant time period is the following year to the implementation; the 
coefficient sign implies an increase in corruption. The result contradicts the previous results of Sub-Saharan 
countries. The UNCAC seems inefficient in judicial corruption, while in public sector corruption, the 
convention is successful.   
8. Robustness Check 
The robustness check of the method is made with the same method but with a different code; this code is 
taken from Schmidheiny (2020). The outcomes are represented in Appendix. The result of the methods 
implies a similar outcome with minor differences in coefficients. There are two main differences in the 
methods, and the first one is in Regression-2: North Africa and the Middle East; the first method suggests 
there is an increase in corruption after political implementations; however, this isn’t the case in the 
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result indicates an increase in corruption in both methods, yet in the first method, the only statistically 
significant result is at t=1, the second method has statistically significant results for both at t=1 and t=2. The 
additional significant time period provides information about the next period, and corruption increases in 




The study aims to see the impact the policies imply on corruption. To do so, I examine how UNCAC affected 
the behavior of 128 countries in terms of corruption. The regressions which use all countries show 
significant changes, except BCI; these results adhere to the expected results of capturing progress in the 
quality of governance. Regression-1-3-4 shows the statistically significant result at the year that policies 
were implemented. The year that policies implemented should not show any changes since it takes time to 
apply the policies and get results. Nonetheless, in UNCAC’s case, the countries signed an agreement couple 
of years before the implementation. Hence it might be normal to see an impact in the year that has been 
implemented. The result implies that the convention was effective when I proceed with the estimation, 
including 128 countries.  
 
The impact of the UNCAC is changing in each continent; not all continents have a significant result. In Sub-
Saharan countries, political implementation decreases the corruption in the year the policies are 
implemented; however, policies lose their impact in the following time period. This decline in Sub-Saharan 
countries is also seen in public sector corrupt exchanges at t=0. Yet, in this case, the next period does not 
significantly identify what happens to implement policies’ impact. Since the early 21st century, Sub-Saharan 
African countries have been implementing anti-corruption policies to attract FDI, aids, and debt forgiveness 
(Omoteso and Ishola Mobolaji, 2014).  This might have an impact on the effectiveness of The UNCAC in 
public sector corruption and corruption. In judicial corruption, Sub-Saharan countries imply an increase in 
corruption at t=1. So, the results of the Sub-Saharan countries show that the UNCAC is ineffective in judicial 
corruption. In North Africa and the Middle East, quality of governance impacts the investment that countries 
receive; this might provide incentives to take action against corruption (Aysan et al., 2007). The results in 
North Africa and the Middle East show that the UNCAC affects public sector corruption at t=1 by reducing 
corruptive exchanges. The policy implementations indicate successful outcomes in public sector corruption. 
This improvement in quality of governance in Sub-Saharan countries and North Africa, and the Middle East 
seems to be due to the international relations' willingness to enchantment. Lastly, the impact is also seen in 
Asian countries in BCI; however, implementation raises the corruption at t=1. Khan (2006) states that Asian 
countries use anti-corruption policies during elections to attack the opponent instead of taking actual actions 
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against corruption. Moreover, political fragmentation in Asian countries is one of the main preventative 
measures to eliminate corruption (Khan, 2006). The fragmentation might be the reason why the UNCAC 
provides an inefficient outcome. The statistically insignificant lead (t=2,3) makes it complicated to comment 
on how much these policies' implementation was helpful. Only one of the results provides statistically 
significant results for the following periods. Another problem might be endogeneity, a third variable that 
causes lower corruption while affecting the independent variable simultaneously. 
 
According to the database, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan countries have a high 
level of corruption. This indicates that countries in these regions need to work on quality of governance; 
therefore, policy implementations are necessary for improvement. In the context of the outcome, the 
convention seems useful for Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East. Therefore, the UN in 
the future convention can focus on these regions and specific governance problems of the countries to adjust 
the conventions to acquire better outcomes. In Asian countries, the convention makes the quality of 
governance worse; therefore, the convention seems unnecessary. Hence, for the Asian countries, if the UN 
provides technical assistance to Asian political implementation instead of including the countries into global 
treaties might improve the results. If the Asian countries together or separately take action subjected to the 
continent or country-specific quality of governance might reach a preferable outcome. I acknowledge that 
corruption is not a simple subject to work on; this study focuses on general corruption indicators. The 
indicators might change for each continent or even each country. These differences might explain why Latin 
America and Western Europe, and North America do not provide significant results on changes that 
occurred due to the UNCAC. For future study, this problem can be solved by focusing on the continent’s 
















Table1-Descriptive Statistics  
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Year 4480 2001 10.101 1984 2018 
Clean Election 4445 .535 .28 0 1 
Corruption 4028 .49 .221 0 1 
Media Corruption 4480 .537 .222 .03 1 
High Court Independence 4445 .532 .286 0 1 
Predictability of Enforcement 4480 .492 .205 0 1 
Judicial Corruption 4445 .495 .225 .05 1 
Judicial Independence  4480 .483 .195 0 1 
Legislature Investigation 4480 .532 .293 0 1 
GDP per capita 4321 9303.626 14737.359 94.565 102913.45 
Population 4471 46840370 1.487e+08 331552 1.393e+09 
Government Expenditure 3943 6.215e+10 2.180e+11 0 2.891e+12 
Inflation 3967 31.397 462.542 -17.64 23773.132 
School Enrollment 3748 98.138 19.529 20.883 177.582 
Official Development Assistance 3429 5.873e+08 9.549e+08 -9.899e+08 2.206e+10 
Bayesian Corruption Index 4006 48.278 16.12 6.45 74.963 
Islam 4375 .288 .453 0 1 
Christianity  4480 .558 .497 0 1 
Judaism 4480 .008 .088 0 1 
Buddhism  4480 .059 .236 0 1 
Colonized by British 4480 .227 .419 0 1 
Colonized by French 4480 .203 .402 0 1 
Colonized by Spanish 4480 .172 .377 0 1 
Colonized by Portugal 4480 .016 .124 0 1 
Coup 4480 .021 .145 0 1 
Election 4480 .182 .386 0 1 
President  4480 .018 .134 0 1 
Central Bank Independence 3205 .501 .191 .104 .904 
Corruption Commission 3954 .065 .248 0 2 
Democracy 3092 .501 .5 0 1 
State Fragility Index 2982 9.408 6.778 0 25 
Transparency Index 3319 49.694 16.712 8 83 
Economic Globalization 4294 51.325 17.103 12.962 94.629 
Monarchy  3833 .067 .25 0 1 
Military  3833 .128 .338 0 4 
Civil War 3837 .01 .102 0 1 
Occupation 3841 .005 .072 0 1 
English Law 4216 .307 .461 0 1 
French Law 4216 .542 .498 0 1 
Communist Law 4216 .083 .276 0 1 
Regime Durability 4335 26.851 32.445 0 209 
Liberal Democracy Index 4307 .389 .278 .013 .891 
Media Corrupt (alternative) 4335 2.349 1.111 .063 3.926 
FDI-in 4196 3.45 10.389 -40.414 280.132 
FDI-out 3899 1.721 10.648 -42.687 301.25 
EEPS 4445 .063 .243 0 1 
Latin America 4445 .173 .378 0 1 
NA_ME 4445 .165 .372 0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4445 .291 .454 0 1 
WE-NA 4445 .157 .364 0 1 
Asia 4445 .149 .356 0 1 
Proportion in Women Parliament 2638 17.506 11.621 0 63.75 
Liberal Democracy 4347 .387 .281 .012 .892 
Gender Equality 4480 .513 .18 0 1 
Direct Democracy 4479 .093 .143 0 .878 
Election free and fair 4480 .52 .288 0 1 
Print/Broadcasting Censorship 4480 .535 .243 .026 1 
Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges 4480 .496 .303 0 1 





In the first step of the estimation of Regression-1, I test the linearity and multicollinearity of the variables. 
The linearity is testes with STATA’ command “linktest”, the test’s result will show no explanatory power 
when it is specified correctly. The outcome of the test implies the estimation is specified correctly and the 
squared values do not have any explanatory power. 
 
Variance inflation factor  
     VIF   1/VIF 














 Public Sector 
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4.755 .21 






 Media Corrupt 3.246 .308 
 Population 3.037 .329 
 Colonized by 
Spanish 
2.945 .34 











 Communist Law 2.084 .48 






 Colonized British 1.827 .547 
















 Proportion of 
Seat Held by 
Women 
1.374 .728 
 FDI-out 1.314 .761 
 Coup 1.09 .917 
 Election 1.062 .941 
 Inflation 1.054 .949 
 Mean VIF 2.715 . 
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I used vif command to check if multicollinearity is present. The rule of thumb suggests that if the VIF value 
is higher than 10, there might be multicollinearity (Curto and Pinto, 2011). Results do not show any 
multicollinearity all VIF values are lower than 10.  In the next step I used Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange 
multiplier test for random effects. I find the p-value to be lower than 0.05. Therefore, there isn’t 
homoskedasticity in the variance. The panel model is necessary. 
 
In the process of deciding to use the fix effect or random effect, I used the Hausman test in Regression-1. 
According to the test below, I reject the null hypothesis, the result indicates that the fix effect seems to be 
consistent estimation.   
 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
     Coef. 
 Chi-square test value 110.181 
 P-value 0 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      66) =     43.381 
    Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
Before passing the fix effect estimation I tested for the autocorrelation which the results prove that the past 
value of corruption has an impact on corruption, the p-value is lower than 0.05. 
 
Regression-2 
The linearity test outcome implies the estimation is specified wrong and needs additional squared values. 
These additional squared values do not have any explanatory power in the panel model; therefore, I didn’t 
include these additional variables in the regression.  
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Variance inflation factor  
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Transparency Index 4.951 .202 
 Print/Broadcasting Censorship 4.684 .213 
 Predictable Enforcement  4.666 .214 
 Judicial Independence 4.623 .216 
State Fragility Index 4.315 .232 
 Clean Election 4.092 .244 
 Judicial Corruption 3.756 .266 
 Public Sector Corrupt Exc. 3.466 .288 
 Population 2.976 .336 
 Media Corrupt 2.751 .364 
 Democracy 2.706 .37 
 Colonized by Spanish 2.658 .376 
 Legislature Investigation 2.57 .389 
 Government Expenditure 2.557 .391 
 GDP per capita 2.403 .416 
 Economic Globalization 2.308 .433 
 Colonized by French 2.082 .48 
 Communist Law 1.867 .536 
 Colonized by British 1.797 .557 
 Regime Durability 1.766 .566 
 Central Bank Independence  1.673 .598 
 Official Dependence Asst. 1.497 .668 
 School Enrollment 1.464 .683 
 Civil War 1.359 .736 
 Direct Democracy 1.342 .745 
 Proportion of Seat Held by 
Women 
1.341 .746 
 FDI-out 1.307 .765 
 Corruption Commission 1.3 .769 
 Coup  1.084 .923 
 Election 1.054 .949 
 Inflation 1.043 .959 
 Mean VIF 2.499 . 
 
 
The multicollinearity test indicates no collinearity, applying the rule of thumb, the values of VIF above are 






In the process of deciding between FE and RE, the Hausman test gives negative chi-square results as an 
alternative I proceed with Mundlak.  The result of the Mundlak indicates some statistically significant mean 
values, which implies the necessity of a panel model. The Mundlak coefficients do not show the same values 
as FE, hence the Mundlak isn’t a consistent estimation. The autocorrelation test implies the existence of the 
impact of the past value on BCI. 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      73) =    215.212 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
The p-value is lower than 0.05, so I reject the null hypothesis. Table-3 (see appendix) providing information 





The linearity test implies that the regression is specified correctly at 5%. The outcome of the 
multicollinearity test gives VIF values lower than 10. 
 
Variance inflation factor  
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Transparency Index 8.28 .121 
 Predictable Enforcement 7.645 .131 
 State Fragility Index 6.497 .154 
 Gender Equality 6.084 .164 
 Print/Broadcasting Censorship 5.953 .168 
 Media Corrupt 5.266 .19 
 Clean Election 4.574 .219 
 Economic Globalization 4.418 .226 
 High Court Independence  3.967 .252 
 GDP per capita 3.231 .31 
 Proportion of Seat Held by Women 2.745 .364 
 Monarchy 1.618 .618 
 Colonized by French 1.594 .627 
 Colonized by Spanish 1.593 .628 
 Government Expenditure 1.516 .66 
 Central Bank Independence 1.459 .686 
 School Enrollment 1.392 .719 
 Colonized by British 1.39 .72 
 Population 1.274 .785 
 Colonized by Portuguese 1.21 .826 
 Direct Democracy 1.205 .83 
 Corruption Commission 1.173 .852 
 Coup 1.065 .939 
 Inflation 1.025 .976 
 Mean VIF 3.174 . 
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The Breusch-Pagan test’s result indicates that the panel models are necessary, the p-value is smaller than 
0.05. I reject the null hypothesis, there isn’t homoskedasticity in variance. 
 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
 Coef. 
Chi-square test value 90.908 
P-value 0 
 
I proceed with the Hausman test which implies that FE is the only consistent estimation, the p-value is lower 
than 0.05. The autocorrelation test indicates that lagged parameter has explanatory power. 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     101) =    690.043 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
Regression-4 
The linearity test reports that the specification is wrong, the regression is not linear. However, in 
multicollinearity result implies high correlation, the VIF values are around 100. Furthermore, the squared 
values are insignificant under the panel models, I proceed with my estimations without the squared variables.  
Variance inflation factor  
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Transparency Index 8.28 .121 
 Predictable Enforcement 7.645 .131 
 State Fragility 6.497 .154 
 Gender Equality 6.084 .164 
 Print/Broadcasting Cencorship 5.953 .168 
 Media Corrupt 5.266 .19 
 Clean Election 4.574 .219 
 Economic Globalization 4.418 .226 
 High Court Independence 3.967 .252 
 GDP per capita 3.231 .31 
 Proportion Seat Held by Women 2.745 .364 
 Monarchy 1.618 .618 
 Colonized by French 1.594 .627 
 Colonized by Spanish 1.593 .628 
 Government Expenditure 1.516 .66 
 Central Bank Independence 1.459 .686 
 School Enrollment Rate 1.392 .719 
 Colonized by British 1.39 .72 
 Population 1.274 .785 
 Colonized by Portuguese 1.21 .826 
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 Direct Democracy 1.205 .83 
 Corruption Commission 1.173 .852 
 Coup 1.065 .939 
 Inflation 1.025 .976 
 Mean VIF 3.174 . 
 
The results of the Breusch-Pagan test prove that the panel model is necessary, there isn’t homoscedasticity 
in variance. The p-value is lower than 0.05. 
 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
     Coef. 
 Chi-square test value 150.482 
 P-value 0 
 
The Hausman test proves the only consistent estimation is FE, the p-value is lower than 0.05. The 
autocorrelation proving the necessity of the lagged dependent variable. 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      87) =    135.654 














2.Regression Results  
Table-1:Corruption 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged Corruption ***1.0016204 ***.99999994 ***1.0015051 ***1.0059809 ***1.0004567 ***1.000555 
 .00104296 1,84E-04 .00168965 ***.00252085   .00172012 .00307402   
Clean Election -.00030811 -4,41E-04 -.00083471 -.00812469   .00093982 .00168511   
 .00148439 3,13E-04 .0013922 .00262301   .00685697 .00458702   
Media Corruption -.00046718 -1,87E-04 -.00068264 -.00672688   .002549 -.00226206   
 .00086374 1,45E-04 .00138789 .0040684   .00571439 .00286208   
Judicial Independence .00451546 -3,30E-05 .00058841 -.00302981   -.01776384 .00630532   
 .00325157 4,48E-04 .00234564 .00474909   .01540515 .01168683   
Predictability of Enforcement .00107437 2,28E-04 -.00093787 -.00172161   -.00876561 -.00648504   
 .00212013 4,75E-04 .00265767 .00615928   .01511873 .0161401   
Judicial Corruption -.00121496 3,80E-04 -.00188848 *-.01092762   *-.02041209 .00568183   
 .00237219 3,98E-04 .00366002 .00607104   .00980017 .0123787   
Legislature Investigation -.00071818 ***2,73E-04 .00052976 *.00510599   .00355093 -.00426078   
 .00079532 8,70E-05 .00098683 .00273406   .01091838 .00312455   
GDP per capita 1,44E-05 8,88E-09 3,53E-06 -2,52E-04 1,36E-05 1,10E-04 
 3,06E-05 1,56E-08 2,70E-05 3,87E-04 2,70E-05 2,45E-04 
Population -1,33E-09 -1,89E-12 1,44E-08 -4,77E-08 1,35E-07 -9,85E-09 
 3,68E-09 4,55E-12 3,98E-08 3,95E-08 1,22E-07 1,23E-08 
Government Expenditure **2,80E-12 -1,17E-16 -2,27E-11 *7,35E-11 -3,92E-12 4,62E-12 
 1,06E-12 4,27E-16 2,58E-11 3,81E-11 2,99E-12 4,34E-12 
Inflation 2,87E-04 -3,61E-07 -.00004844 ***.00010133   -.00005215 **-.00007633   
 3,42E-04 1,11E-06 .00005306 .00003408   .00008842 .00002567   
Lagged Inflation  *-2,83E-07     
  1,24E-07     
School Enrollment -1,15E-03 -1,64E-06 .00003903 **.00002869   -.00007552 .00004533   
 8,12E-03 1,13E-06 .00004255 .00001102   .00005324 .00006838   
Official Development Assistance 7,91E-11 1,78E-14 1,34E-10 *2,29E-10  5,60E-10 
 6,30E-11 6,92E-14 2,89E-10 1,25E-10  5,97E-10 
Coup .00028908 -6,46E-05 .00114148 .00010341    -.00019878   
 *.0001719 *3,61E-05 .00124378 .00044883    .00051131   
Election .00007937 7,97E-06 .00010925 .00018121    -.00040075   
 .00008774 7,21E-06 .00015592 .00023764    .00061184   
Central Bank Independence .000582 -3,17E-04 -.00060437 .00298328    -.00208742   
 .00068819 1,84E-04 .00065573 .00245367    .00942529   
Corruption Commission -.00040568 5,85E-05 (omitted) (omitted)   (omitted) .00309956   
 .00048879 4,12E-05                  .0017487   
Democracy .00014431 -4,16E-05 -.00126703 *-.00118951    .00044753   
 .00017784 3,65E-05 .00159828 .00064724    .00077755   
State Fragility Index -.00001314 3,46E-06 .00009229 .00002121   .0003365 -.00014632   
 .00005572 8,03E-06 .00009772 .00011733   .0002417 .0002016   
Transparency Index .00002063 -1,82E-06 -7,53E-03 .00003729   -.00001364 .00007898   
 .00002515 2,65E-06 .00001324 .00004681   .0000559 .00008167   
Economic Globalization -.00001467 2,51E-06 -8,87E-03 -4,76E-03 .00006603 -.00004718   
 .00001693 2,99E-06 .00002433 .00002773   .00011579 .00006321   
Regime Durability 6,32E-03 *2,15E-05 3,22E-03 -.00005875   .00038701 .00002076   
 7,73E-03 1,22E-05 6,28E-03 .00004196   .00028071 .00001968   
Civil War -.00017158 (omitted) (omitted) -.00192241   (omitted) (omitted)   
 .00061102   .00142432     
FDI-out -.00001304 **1,87E-05 .00002548 -.00002684   -7,95E-03 .00029039   
 .00001282 7,37E-06 .00003985 .00002305   .0000106 .00045815   
Proportion in Women Parliament -.00001056 2,13E-06 .00001446 -.00001079   -.00008704 -.00007833   
 .00001698 2,68E-06 .0000212 .00004899   .00005408 .00007249   
Direct Democracy .00014849 -2,99E-05 .00063871 -.00068829   *.00609541 -.00112461   
 .00082668 1,47E-04 .00111197 .00383457   .00329462 .00799275   
Print/Broadcasting Censorship -.00105747 5,06E-05 .00033422 *.0076241   .00043792 -.00163041   
 .00139566 2,07E-04 .00162732 .0037389   .00365131 .00509212   
Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges .00063962 -2,91E-04 .00004515 .00326071   -.00549994 .00025829   
 .00073405 1,68E-04 .00074337 .0028323   .00683899 .00393304   
Constant -.00384985 3,79E-04 -.00459315 -.00828054   .00979466 -.0037565   
Lead4 .00007801 4,02E-06 -.00040051 .00014965   -.00055944 .00130529   
 .00013626 3,27E-05 .00048357 .00044137   .00081598 .00078371   
Lead3 .00007 1,22E-05 -.00020524 .00017784   .00009807 *.00132501   
 .00008527 3,29E-05 .00027406 .00034023   .00070883 .00071117   
Lead2 .00006542 -1,48E-05 -.00040077 -.00004395   .00019983 .00073568   
 .00006802 1,82E-05 .00046342 .00031724   .00039476 .00049925   
Lag0 *-.00042033 -6,59E-06 -.00075017 -.00085488   .00047212 -.0001981   
 .00023389 1,52E-05 .00079149 .00054303   .00047426 .00052015   
Lag1 -.00026779 7,44E-06 .00021889 -.00022066   -.00007951 -.00114111   
 .00023265 2,36E-05 .00029203 .00056364   .00077288 .00114137   
Lag2 .00024176 4,00E-06 -.00006018 .00066735   -.00052455 .00022402   
 .00014936 3,79E-05 .00027576 .00044705   .00065724 .00196867   
Lag3 -.0001288 -1,49E-05 .00010499 .00020228   -.000209 -.00016206   
 .00021952 4,71E-05 .00033675 .00054765   .00069537 .00292192   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table-2: Bayesian Corruption Index 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged BCI  -.0015086 -.00408356 .00075472  ***.01501971 
  .00498162 .0053625 .00295115  .00485864 
Clean Election -.11922904 -3.7523613 .5744586 .9382603 2.7557336 2.0525506 
 .66692451 2.6166013 .78540122 .74116744 5.9072759 3.622909 
Media Corruption **2.7102617 2.3467815 -1.4218165 ***4.4117942 1.1708066 **6.2163147 
 1.0902288 2.1135469 1.0079894 1.4329252 11.274582 2.1612518 
Judicial Independence -1.0308755 -4.8598949 -5.2047432 -1.2977442 *-16.075666 5.3242109 
 2.0956596 4.2730375 6.1267232 4.4227001 8.491929 4.7262904 
Predictability of Enforcement -1.4898221 5.4789481 -2.0217763 **-7.345.799 -2.6835388 **15.275126 
 2.7336079 6.8880826 3.7944229 3.1412626 11.770556 6.5565304 
Judicial Corruption .90318443 2.5348881 *9.8020361 *3.0915365 33.975872 **-13.403825 
 2.1081119 4.6702862 4.8225934 1.8167856 24.478949 5.0565277 
Legislature Investigation .53159731 1.3946296 -.24903206 .41546506 -1.1092897 -1.8109682 
 .57552152 .97365618 .58491328 .89965257 4.7790001 1.5035971 
GDP per capita -.00003395 ***-.00024757 -.00004893 -.00008811 .00001261 .00009831 
 .00004244 .00008022 .00003546 .00025089 .00002254 .00016327 
Population **7,97E-06 1,38E-06 4,82E-05 8,42E-06 2,27E-05 2,96E-06 
 3,98E-06 5,05E-05 3,17E-05 2,30E-05 1,06E-04 8,21E-06 
Government Expenditure ***-4,01E-09 2,92E-09 -6,35E-09 3,14E-08 3,31E-09 ***-7,91E-09 
 1,27E-09 5,06E-09 1,68E-08 2,65E-08 2,95E-09 1,78E-09 
Inflation -.00032067 .0029344 ***-.02761072 *.01414677 -.04240023 **.03560197 
 .00026543 .00816977 .00898486 .0070188 .07704669 .01332099 
School Enrollment .00714031 -.014861 -.01263362 *.00850452 .0084465 -.02605645 
 .00588923 .01045558 .01801217 .00467914 .02975414 .02473025 
Official Development Assistance 7,50E-08 9,11E-07 4,26E-07 6,47E-08  1,13E-07 
 6,92E-08 6,49E-07 2,46E-07 6,47E-08  2,69E-07 
Coup .0171573 -.06826385 ***1.2427351 .08346544  -.0358066 
 .1222428 .26274566 .38782225 .10616045  .45714566 
Election -.00299243 .21053668 .0263209 .06981609  -.29751151 
 .04368853 .10440968 .06460663 .05157705  .2751505 
Central Bank Independence .45870907 -.18200201 *-.88427349 23.912.437  .64546263 
 .78696745 1.5527372 .47576457 1.8086662  2.4308628 
Corruption Commission .34637945 **1.1531665 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -1.050.425 
 .6421609 .52463186    .98659244 
Democracy -.19976708 .05485874 -.42928456 -.14322624  -.82155945 
 .17871334 .25391478 .91553408 .24523017  .67537233 
State Fragility Index -.01857541 -.10858638 -.1028934 -.04858635 -.26405043 .25918466 
 .05796521 .1578294 .06264194 .05057242 .30448558 .14850361 
Transparency Index -.00104042 .01479477 .02174619 .0197029 *-.11756631 *-.07486352 
 .01337221 .02765942 .01428537 .01840974 .06660891 .03877388 
Economic Globalization -.00863201 -.01934136 *-.0439686 -.02413369 -.06488592 .03063445 
 .01648458 .03887102 .02253596 .01523426 .05117868 .03469308 
Regime Durability -.01706467 .02781898 -.00789146 *-.0251662 -.09340978 .00583333 
 .01542777 .08475466 .00620381 .01480609 .10324831 .02798114 
Civil War -.32450008 (omitted) (omitted) -1.2728925 (omitted) (omitted) 
 .43876111   .75771746   
FDI-out .01993561 .0212051 .01029893 -.00340804 -.00930876 .14763569 
 .01234188 .02896025 .00999914 .01004346 .00682574 .24238945 
Proportion in Women Parliament -.00662674 -.02479423 -.01301008 .02587228 .11924395 -.06486899 
 .01589089 .03097626 .01751727 .02557429 .0724091 .05373682 
Direct Democracy .81484738 -.63862036 ***-2.7930218 -1.1175436 .7751611 .5208714 
 .7250219 1.7401956 .864757 1.3807219 2.5273677 3.7303363 
Print/Broadcasting Censorship -.99373547 -1.4686591 .08342924 -1.3249152 -8.2257389 -4.501254 
 1.0632153 2.0556982 1.9588282 1.3227511 6.044.805 3.8709207 
Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges .40399976 -.35767133 **1.4201543 -.01367411 4.7473342 -3.1993486 
 .85315581 1.8700075 .55154114 .41346789 3.8116418 2.1468302 
Constant ***53.547561 ***60.395777 ***48.050253 ***56.9236 24.546818 ***50.757.975 
Lead4 -.02957038 -.54216925 .21963281 .03948291 .81403134 **-1.1678566 
 .13704323 .34191493 .16787277 .18385258 .53080489 .45286376 
Lead3 -.0462715 -.19757074 *.21495726 .00842996 .24987841 -.67953728 
 .09662168 .15883371 .11920991 .15656364 .28741342 .49154679 
Lead2 -.02283709 -.21342725 -.06473532 .04045246 .12358731 **-.70748253 
 .07798658 .18951687 .1246627 .14069595 .1429585 .28150431 
Lag0 -.04617207 .30331792 .09590849 -.06570299 -.32268094 -.16092307 
 .06028106 .18640242 .15290948 .07294486 .19954127 .44657671 
Lag1 -.17666738 .28219667 .28021204 .03073239 -.59868522 *.59570124 
 .12967267 .25405244 .17192351 .1022913 .40418679 .29119673 
Lag2 -.16532243 .55163584 **.45999041 .09829139 -.68288404 .24181998 
 .22006427 .31782057 .21206384 .17786305 .40048214 .69831147 
Lag3 -.12920926 .50158127 ***.89774788 -.13956182 *-.9329385 1.1359244 
 .30947911 .50100854 .16675832 .21553839 .48238113 1.0349334 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
i.Year Yes No No No No No 
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Table -3: Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges 
 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 












Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged Public S. Corrupt -.01081133 -.01751036 .02603597 *-.0233148 -.00082656 -.00501715   
 .00749415 .01045576 .02112716 .01270181 .00370374 .0258132   
Clean Election .04884245 .02283899 -.01061327 -.04324294 .06324061 -.11934876   
 .11817057 .21450371 .04633815 .14016068 .04779818 .0795473   
Media Corruption -.1769793 .06839622 -.1666685 -.19492898 ***-.11688777 -.02339342   
 .11375402 .06055626 .11150801 .24231016 .0343588 .10726058   
High Court Independence .05427072 .10692679 .20621362 -.16251872 .06247461 .15569842   
 .08570073 .0863642 .19774753 .13388888 .06594096 .1232382   
Predictability of Enforcement -.36288288 .18203582 -.25557774 **-.64942254 -.03965312 ***-1.2044653 
 .22583022 .16305796 .29666638 .27801695 .0764177 .24771364   
GDP per capita **1,18E-03 -3,20E-03 -2,92E-03 **.00001329 1,22E-04 -1,35E-03 
 4,99E-04 3,08E-03 1,82E-03 5,80E-03 9,28E-05 2,67E-03 
Population 1,77E-07 *-3,79E-06 1,24E-06 -6,12E-07 8,42E-09 -2,51E-07 
 2,72E-07 1,83E-06 2,88E-06 1,97E-06 6,47E-07 2,20E-07 
School Enrollment **.00125447 .00074409 **-.00416194 ***.00145992 .00011655 .00170321   
 .00057634 .00136367 .00161652 .00033074 .00018421 .00122873   
Inflation **.00009436 -.00010619 *.00107072 -.0004735 -.0001726 -.00005351   
 .00003962 .00033943 .0005576 .00035461 .0005697 .00107594   
Government Expenditure -2,54E-11 2,45E-10 **2,10E-09 5,48E-10 -8,19E-12 6,66E-12 
 2,72E-11 1,61E-10 7,23E-10 8,00E-10 1,37E-11 7,48E-11 
Coup .00503702 -.0033947 -.01975204 .00643985 (omitted) .02737168   
 .00858852 .01903656 .03350508 .01807268  .01779837   
Central Bank Independence -.05832553 -.01644237 -.05400336 .01763924 .00545787 -.08293067   
 .03517174 .08110624 .04027803 .05725081 .00564602 .13456254   
Corruption Commission .03248745 .00841692 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) **-.06866634   
 .0315549 .03134034    .02420814   
State Fragility Index -.00165336 .00717473 -.00332696 .00259539 .00002242 .00229797   
 .00343387 .00620893 .00483387 .00402057 .00072829 .01080413   
Transparency Index **-.0021001 .00168195 .0006231 **-.00308873 -.00001294 -6,83E-03 
 .00100943 .00294527 .00186256 .00137237 .0002643 .00200752   
Economic Globalization .0010204 .00226966 ***.00316193 ***.0033082 -.00010444 -.00116823   
 .00097961 .00171556 .00105328 .00096792 .00056005 .00168448   
Proportion in Women Parliament *.00224865 -.00020643 *-.00543293 **.00506884 -.00019693 .00029351   
 .00126665 .00071876 .00264722 .00230893 .00037004 .00187073   
Gender Equality *-.18803206 -.19989808 **.67938276 -.26834331 .01784956 -.34857246   
 .10008868 .25978417 .31373718 .18943449 .01142908 .36800454   
Direct Democracy **.16147011 **.24746256 -.19176718 **.38845681 -.00100491 .20468251   
 .07645386 .08956762 .12240004 .16419851 .01257467 .17020302   
Print/Broadcasting Censorship -.07198695 **-.14582758 -.40833348 **-.36579391 -.06580806 *.28175566   
 .10579241 .06617175 .2753648 .14491879 .0649324 .15222113   
Monarchy -.00673594 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) .00264964   
 .04775475     .04593873   
Constant ***1.7971064 ***1.2119146 ***1.911527 ***2.2450794 ***1.1582018 ***2.1136299 
Lead4 .00867543 .01309619 -.00758892 .01867847 .00314546 -.01376004   
 .0095564 .01743751 .03955611 .01354312 .00253129 .02309889   
Lead3 .00791981 **-.01378661 **.02466887 .00345318 -.00114205 *.0258543   
 .00514292 .00594782 .01147535 .00808942 .00178013 .01399979   
Lead2 .00721304 -.01271424 **.01938048 .00219286 -.00132667 .02367889   
 .00499282 .00783975 .00785413 .00582505 .00194663 .01409609   
Lag0 **-.00682863 .00364051 -.0145519 *-.01146858 -.00086404 .00009253   
 .00334568 .00831473 .01417131 .00644062 .00085946 .01475957   
Lag1 **-.01272379 .00334727 -.00106603 **-.02300075 -.0034982 .02791563   
 .00538283 .00754045 .01118634 .01029208 .0030549 .01435328   
Lag2 -.01392515 .00529157 -.02289997 **-.0234005 -.00256209 .02196557   
 .00917429 .01191607 .02463163 .01109645 .00189314 .01905837   
Lag3 -.01279808 .00933814 -.02825698 *-.02589181 -.00374914 .02382417   
 .01024092 .01564926 .01695672 .01309884 .00282904 .02548724   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
i.Year No No No No No No 
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Table-4: Judicial Corruption 
 
















Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged Judicial Corruption *-.00626086 -.00099841 -5,47E-03 -.00697546 .00007027 -.00055184   
 .00342696 .00681338 .00491726 .00750289 .00118899 .00784223   
Judicial Independence ***-.40282711 ***-.49780956 -.04137517 ***-.39172851 -.01247089 ***-.41329848   
 .05337842 .10720503 .14175991 .10211192 .02144641 .07024322   
Predictability of Enforcement ***-.22722511 -.16713712 -.17499034 *-.27085879 .00798412 -.01264485   
 .08370479 .103412 .19505329 .14363951 .01797704 .13126808   
Inflation -.00007504 -.00018302 -.00025893 ***-.00026276 -.00005327 -.00039443   
 .00005363 .00015966 .00020801 .00005051 .00020488 .00024648   
School Enrollment ***-.00050253 .00037354 -.00045238 **-.00047278 -.00008162 .000227   
 .00018294 .00040152 .00048423 .0001931 .0000791 .00052706   
Official Development Assistance 2,20E-09 -3,49E-09 -1,77E-10 2,05E-09  5,09E-09 
 1,98E-09 2,52E-08 3,88E-09 2,88E-09  3,71E-09 
Central Bank Independence .02780442 **.09254057 **.0418877 -.00477832 -.0034341 -.01278701   
 .01699045 .03314424 .0177181 .03520932 .00257445 .04398294   
Corruption Commission .00256557 -.00591223 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) .00295003   
 .00724061 .00909231    .01333063   
State Fragility Index *.00221851 **.00482056 -.00061535 *.00387769 -.00025004 -.00266378   
 .00116266 .00227707 .00159241 .0020512 .00080086 .00264657   
Transparency Index -.00008371 -.00054772 *.00074124 -.00053752 -.00022155 .00009636   
 .0003633 .00068063 .00038268 .00058087 .00017808 .00069096   
Economic Globalization .00046834 -.00013011 *-.00140531 .0004327 .00001223 .00071861   
 .00034802 .00052171 .00072649 .00043996 .00015836 .00072476   
Media Corrupt -.00538669 .01110356 -.00111042 **-.03738892 -.01119722 -.0006349   
 .00835363 .01566282 .00719832 .01831213 .01119014 .00789383   
FDI-in **.00053605 **.00125171 .00005872 *.0004202 -.00004564 .00138203   
 .00024882 .00055712 .00038374 .00022152 .0000331 .00083938   
Gender Equality *-.0835752 *.06855178 *-.22252405 -.03860479 -.00393949 -.07082365   
 .04339258 .03944281 .11292328 .08522255 .00685504 .14580081   
Direct Democracy *-.03734319 *-.05512697 -.03423772 *-.06999575 -.01743397 ***.16496844   
 .019724 .03104805 .05233759 .0379374 .01301301 .03726904   
Election Free and Fair .0146352 **.05918473 .0093493 .0067894 **.04469878 .00816283   
 .01881548 .02798192 .00703818 .02371817 .02073815 .01715729   
Print/Broadcasting Censorship .05242091 -.00051506 -.0874818 **.16050884 -.01353783 -.02208513   
 .0407144 .0534242 .04995854 .06518512 .01544313 .04322454   
Public Sector Corrupt Exchange -.01426895 .01388869 .01417885 -.00216903 .00388715 -.06090571   
 .02855429 .02556412 .02466363 .04014289 .02062355 .04677658   
Constant ***1.9032331 ***1.6602004 ***1.8340803 ***1.9618274 ***1.2249389 ***1.823902 
Lead4 .00018687 .00673179 **-.00709802 -.00389818 -.00279962 .00475662   
 .0040674 .00511133 .00329634 .00781596 .00340661 .00878451   
Lead3 .00328466 .00631175 -.00195063 .00205946 -.00242943 .00461418   
 .00303395 .00572251 .00299464 .0046846 .00311004 .0117418   
Lead2 .0023293 -.00047669 .00003231 .00050634 -.00259611 .00376215   
 .00240441 .00294021 .0034755 .00391619 .00328798 .01157577   
Lag0 -.00198345 -.00205578 .00203869 -.00077893 -.00067537 -.00538649   
 .00208537 .00494032 .00259922 .00306895 .00064297 .00480927   
Lag1 *.00431562 *.0060255 .00458036 .00632555 -.00298034 -.00967852   
 .0025147 .0031246 .00458907 .00431942 .00260732 .00603799   
Lag2 .00520428 -.00042784 .00693811 .00483513 -.00394423 -.00028337   
 .00350493 .00482565 .00640532 .00683727 .0033844 .00803591   
Lag3 .00628646 .00967185 .00854317 .00704266 -.00701543 -.00794838   
 .00448419 .00616186 .00586997 .00870589 .00479861 .00678872   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
i.Year No No No No No No 
 42 
3.Robustness Check  
Table-5: Corruption 
 
Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged Corruption ***1.0015643 ***.99999998 ***1.0007615 ***1.0058079 ***.99935753 ***1.002193 
 .00107524 1,01E-04 .00103447 .00283179 .0018284 .00249616   
Clean Election .00049605 7,81E-07 .0002723 ***.00834526 .00219465 -.00382456   
 .00139285 4,80E-04 .00112484 .00230154 .00658437 .00382159   
Media Corruption .00067715 2,04E-05 .00135526 *.00832281 -.00445044 .0057022   
 .00093363 1,85E-04 .00173718 .004349 .00569283 .00519767   
Judicial Independence -.00467567 -2,94E-06 -.00144585 .00104196 .01454925 -.00221124   
 .0031767 1,65E-04 .00331175 .00434006 .01079715 .00913349   
Predictability of Enforcement -.00094528 -1,97E-05 .00314075 .00004065 .00635197 -.00497697   
 .00217634 2,55E-04 .00414332 .00567915 .01598022 .02177597   
Judicial Corruption .00169155 -3,69E-05 .0024651 .01135617 *.03045155 -.00216496   
 .0023066 1,13E-03 .00357547 .00689087 .01756118 .0113422   
Legislature Investigation .00076797 *-2,62E-05 .00015371 *-.00450728 -.00073822 .0055738   
 .00079209 1,36E-05 .00079981 .00233765 .01272542 .00398809   
GDP per capita -1,34E-05 4,79E-10 -2,87E-05 3,70E-04 9,08E-07 -6,36E-05 
 3,08E-05 9,07E-10 4,05E-05 4,19E-04 2,68E-05 2,02E-04 
Population 2,34E-09 -3,96E-13 -2,46E-08 *6,75E-08 -1,15E-07 5,43E-09 
 3,87E-09 6,90E-12 4,73E-08 3,34E-08 1,11E-07 1,40E-08 
Government Expenditure **-3,13E-12 2,83E-17 3,15E-11 **-7,74E-11 3,62E-12 -7,15E-12 
 1,24E-12 7,51E-16 3,59E-11 3,64E-11 3,15E-12 5,15E-12 
Inflation -1,56E-04 5,96E-08 .0000373 ***-.00008686 .00009839 ***.00009087   
 3,45E-04 4,25E-07 .00004409 .00003009 .00009403 .00002625   
Lagged Inflation  ***3,46E-08                   
  1,14E-08                   
School Enrollment -1,84E-03 2,86E-07 -.00004131 **-.00003167 .00005923 -.00006452   
 7,48E-03 3,46E-06 .00004511 .00001179 .00005456 .00007462   
Official Development Assistance -8,50E-11 3,93E-16 -1,49E-10 *-2,44E-10  -5,91E-10 
 7,75E-11 4,57E-14 2,68E-10 1,33E-10  4,22E-10 
Coup **-.0003662 5,80E-06 -.00083408 -.00024354  -.00072006   
 .0001724 4,42E-05 .00098114 .00050198  .00069245   
Election -.00007204 3,91E-07 -.00009355 -.00020905  .0005378   
 .00007341 7,56E-06 .00013278 .00020249  .00047146   
Central Bank Independence -.0008378 3,59E-05 .0008373 -.00267687  .00168029   
 .00066776 1,38E-04 .00099082 .00238713  .00666503   
Corruption Commission .00049636 -3,43E-06 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -.00100227   
 .00041657 2,80E-05    .0010946   
Democracy -.00016268 4,88E-06 .00025387 *.00112344  .00036995   
 .00016262 9,25E-06 .00090734 .00061384  .00125859   
State Fragility Index 9,12E-03 -1,55E-06 -.00006338 -2,63E-06 -.00025849 .00024492   
 .00005357 1,29E-05 .00007013 .00011073 .00023838 .00026909   
Transparency Index -.00002233 1,26E-07 8,40E-03 -.00004279 .00001566 -.00006939   
 .00002567 1,07E-06 .00001583 .00004867 .00005854 .00007886   
Economic Globalization .00001253 -3,31E-07 .00001113 -3,78E-03 -.00003483 .00010103   
 .00001666 1,85E-06 .00001983 .00002905 .00010708 .00006099   
Regime Durability -6,68E-03 -1,43E-06 -3,28E-03 .00005105 -.00044903 -.00002066   
 7,86E-03 3,99E-05 4,62E-03 .00003938 .00026927 .00002854   
Civil War .00018073 (omitted) (omitted) .00170495 (omitted) (omitted)   
 .00052774   .00134351                 
FDI-out 8,01E-03 -1,47E-06 -.00002981 .00001213 3,82E-03 -.0001287   
 .00001099 2,58E-06 .00004261 .00001953 8,82E-03 .00027717   
Proportion in Women Parliament .00001083 -1,71E-07 -.00002497 .00001885 .00008611 .00001981   
 .00001565 4,10E-06 .00003076 .0000431 .00005854 .00008291   
Direct Democracy -.00011906 -1,91E-06 -.00105407 -.00005113 *-.0061012 -.00148058   
 .00082355 1,97E-05 .00150192 .00363825 .00342618 .00608244   
Print/Broadcasting Censorship .0006949 3,76E-06 -.00031946 **-.00795266 -.00176325 .00050437   
 .0013979 8,86E-05 .00242093 .0034609 .00368556 .0048438   
Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges -.00049745 2,99E-06 .00030065 -.00338589 .00226805 -.00047248   
 .00073642 2,02E-04 .00103049 .00288802 .00671762 .00290389   
Constant .00085625 1,63E-05 .0011446 -.0035746 -.0101013 .00003377   
Lag3_tre .00025239 4,63E-06 .00018339 .00020271 -.00028113 .00184403   
 .00019258 1,16E-05 .00031704 .0003971 .00034041 .00107758   
Lag2_tre .00005982 -1,93E-06 .00014133 .00014227 -.000243 -.00046297   
 .00008073 3,67E-05 .00023596 .00035322 .0003752 .00051632   
Lag_tre .00020094 -2,63E-06 -.00009738 .00042901 -.00070146 -1,28E-03 
 .00017081 3,66E-05 .00024394 .00050063 .00048209 .00095781   
tre *.00044031 -1,85E-06 .00034482 .00029245 -.00070632 .00016347   
 .0002536 2,21E-05 .00045004 .0005105 .00083234 .00118041   
Lead_tre .00019693 -3,05E-06 -.00036158 .00065856 -.00015039 .00013538   
 .0002219 1,24E-05 .00043325 .000558 .00106521 .00109715   
Lead2_tre .00043369 -3,60E-06 -.00003157 *.00095174 .00013858 .00066736   
 .00032177 4,16E-06 .00025904 .00054641 .00048923 .00149447   
Lead3_tre .00008222 -5,39E-06 -.00012465 .00038606 -.00076625 -.00053556   
 .00027398 5,15E-06 .0002575 .00055069 .0009496 .0010445   
Lead4_tre .00010614 -4,00E-06 -.00021537 .0002634 -.00078834 .00159127   
 .00018598 4,19E-06 .00033886 .0004735 .00129693 .00243689   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table-6: Bayesian Corruption Index 
 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged BCI  -.00162908 -.00383063 .00100145 .01279688 .03009229   
  .00486916 .00417203 .00278099 .00654356 .01009383   
Clean Election -.0401427 -2.977251 .68359445 .9260129 -8.9419814 .95498716   
 .66926498 2.1922711 1.0439018 .59312738 7.4897641 2.262436 
Media Corruption **2.7711617 2.8711888 -1.0790033 ***4.5707713 -5.6817931 *4.1135096 
 1.0980987 1.859.858 .93750478 1.5093999 1.0508707 2.2107235 
Judicial Independence -1.1683151 -3.7588072 -1.7746052 -.77290393 -1.2767381 2.1016963 
 2.1580418 4.5472843 6.1848799 3.8487718 1.2487599 6.0508188 
Predictability of Enforcement -1.5549629 .1633706 -6.6407036 **-7.1470589 6.3816899 6.8315673 
 2.8327291 6.2447743 3.8444781 2.7606124 1.3152685 6.3524856 
Judicial Corruption 1.2549704 2.055481 7.0778625 2.860439 3.6321854 **-11.015526 
 2.1836385 4.761627 4.4130945 1.864876 2.2643539 5.0868311 
Legislature Investigation .46092088 **1.8877598 -.42402624 .52213748 -3.2816877 -1.0170537 
 .59101878 .85899214 .79517268 .84259906 4.8642833 1.1237804 
GDP per capita -.00003479 **-.00030001 -.00003535 -.00014009 -.00001984 .00023579   
 .00004228 .00010863 .00003409 .00023518 .00002929 .00011457   
Population *7,89E-06 2,16E-05 5,38E-05 3,61E-06 -5,09E-05 1,27E-05 
 4,32E-06 5,21E-05 3,49E-05 1,79E-05 1,11E-04 6,07E-06 
Government Expenditure ***-4,02E-09 -9,37E-10 -1,57E-09 3,65E-08 4,25E-09 ***-6,77E-09 
 1,43E-09 5,87E-09 1,79E-08 2,57E-08 2,54E-09 1,36E-09 
Inflation -.00030913 -.00356582 -.00551164 **.01487668 -.01919617 .01379039   
 .00028124 .00735131 .00816461 .00653775 .07753506 .02073787   
School Enrollment .00676518 *-.01993102 -.01642717 .00744282 .02856317 -.0109773   
 .00617931 .01039623 .01769526 .00473773 .04018369 .01719169   
Official Development Assistance 7,55E-08 8,06E-07 ***5,26E-07 6,54E-08  2,16E-07 
 7,31E-08 7,27E-07 1,75E-07 6,25E-08  2,27E-07 
Coup .02842535 -.19668835 1.0806879 .0763649  -.0370894   
 .11905717 .24743619 .63041962 .11573265  .44288461   
Election -.01074331 .16657064 .03225697 .07058669  -.04806309   
 .04770957 .09651557 .07734858 .04699676  .19578596   
Central Bank Independence .41531361 1.0291858 -.28655355 2.4057377  1.6683033 
 .78188723 1.320.165 .39590668 1.7993399  1.9757086 
Corruption Commission .32611311 *.82963593 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -.83024751   
 .63023613 .42018595    .71814685   
Democracy -.2136929 .10780367 .51158022 -.07658493  **-1.2009332 
 .18118923 .2364014 .95992093 .17196398  .48589619   
State Fragility Index -.02362095 -.15808522 -.0990756 -.04605006 -.10823764 .15345247   
 .05550475 .15023461 .07204076 .05132745 .31627754 .08793543   
Transparency Index -.00177154 .01223819 .0331541 .01511685 *-.12763741 **-.09495904   
 .01364303 .0275894 .01909603 .01782608 .06720644 .04334582   
Economic Globalization -.00846852 -.01292065 -.02826508 -.02182558 -.06178322 -.00732321   
 .01629911 .04117064 .02174177 .01385535 .05182241 .01962166   
Regime Durability -.01646952 .05734142 *-.01537513 **-.02447832 **-.2095969 .00526088   
 .01503964 .10299335 .00822596 .00982973 .07517084 .02817346   
Civil War -.28304344 (omitted) (omitted) *-1.1410865 (omitted) (omitted)   
 .42568762   .65372481                 
FDI-out .01726053 .03334044 **.01621384 -.00256966 -.00054951 .04494132   
 .01126958 .03371521 .00740225 .01075597 .00581235 .13265653   
Proportion in Women Parliament -.00862731 -.01906618 .00614943 .02056651 .10114176 -.02405352   
 .01509555 .02268687 .01628294 .02740407 .06086592 .03996747   
Direct Democracy .88246611 -.33671203 **-3.0859476 -.88728568 -.54585539 .1295729   
 .73118179 1.717454 1.1132765 142.131 2.391.825 3.0237784 
Print/Broadcasting Censorship -1.0079316 -.41549795 1.1567547 -1.3377265 -7.1351335 -.30814459   
 1.0963633 2.1036762 2.0857072 1.247.949 6.3358466 2.1905699 
Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges .43413934 .06667144 1.4403368 -.08977409 .00439588 -.20314258   
 .84347727 1.7183746 .99891717 .53835062 4.4386006 2.0195742 
Constant ***53.586184 ***59.56697 47.916472 56.869835 44.912045 5.020136 
Lag3_tre .03846107 -.24492944 -.23692668 .03203832 .37818621 .30425164   
 .1213221 .1484074 .18804712 .12020173 .23652141 .36635015   
Lag2_tre .07627481 -.263543 -.30423026 .05926508 .49675729 **1.0918875 
 .15162588 .22599194 .21620426 .13656966 .36724571 .384457   
Lag_tre .13458498 -.03601701 ***-.4524875 .13175297 .68848446 ***1.1017832 
 .18654102 .25446129 .13044175 .15455808 .52710367 .35740019   
tre .11630409 -.03957097 ***-.73591482 .13701475 .92586824 ***1.5528157 
 .23930792 .31752746 .10926229 .1867633 .64040283 .33657123   
Lead_tre .15276039 .15809192 ***-.64771554 .09560228 .86728036 ***2.0632284 
 .3010214 .36081651 .13296851 .24791261 .5961286 .52725609   
Lead2_tre .19716133 .38465281 -.4004729 .03146951 1.2697969 ***2.0207548 
 .3222069 .36873306 .26974599 .28632605 .85929098 .60916844   
Lead3_tre .1133149 .60652172 **-.58885705 .17904243 1.1835005 **1.7801836 
 .31404976 .4284894 .25197154 .36180056 .67191879 .65684127   
Lead4_tre -.05079335 .5535355 -.00812557 -.06803222 1.3244717 .02075549   
 .3028407 .39377624 .21522007 .42138587 .79182971 1.1214871 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table-7: Public Sector Corrupt Exchange  
 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged Public S. Corrupt -.01026676 -.01482309 *.03132483 **-.02935957 -.00018996 -.00222043   
 .00750199 .0101984 .01542869 .0123996 .00400601 .02192247   
Clean Election -.05799123 -.0321857 .01622653 .04737036 -.05025504 **.1847227   
 .12351637 .21363293 .03851419 .15068839 .04880785 .0698422   
Media Corruption .16369287 -.09604785 .15134403 .2331789 ***.1303303 .06169642   
 .11665251 .08004747 .09434048 .23416986 .03495404 .12492467   
High Court Independence -.04654577 -.11839152 -.24233688 .18414258 -.05758716 -.18460727   
 .08796806 .09317762 .2227705 .12619899 .06689692 .11823828   
Predictability of Enforcement *.37423524 -.12517941 .3540474 **.67122768 .03841512 ***1.2503214 
 .22438824 .13675122 .30124933 .31586191 .0769251 .28012077   
GDP per capita -7,37E-04 5,92E-03 *2,85E-03 *-7,37E-03 -7,90E-05 2,95E-03 
 4,59E-04 4,05E-03 1,45E-03 4,26E-03 6,31E-05 4,74E-03 
Population -7,14E-08 2,84E-06 -4,62E-07 2,33E-06 -2,02E-07 1,57E-07 
 2,44E-07 1,65E-06 1,14E-06 2,35E-06 5,89E-07 2,39E-07 
School Enrollment **-.00126481 -.00060564 **.0044027 ***-.00124895 -.00010615 -.00149995   
 .00061301 .00134249 .00161487 .00037407 .00019313 .00127039   
Inflation **-.00009368 .00043677 *-.0013538 .00051214 .0002444 .00053808   
 .00004162 .00038453 .00072838 .00035103 .00053038 .00102797   
Government Expenditure 3,88E-11 -6,60E-11 **-2,07E-09 -6,86E-10 1,39E-11 -6,21E-12 
 2,66E-11 1,50E-10 8,03E-10 8,66E-10 1,32E-11 7,67E-11 
Coup -.00281549 -.00440182 .03599212 -.00916538 (omitted) -.02040839   
 .00884482 .02107204 .02417742 .0154341  .01661861   
Central Bank Independence *.06007165 .00554983 .00448658 -.00135855 -.00656616 .10379108   
 .03469168 .08768804 .05341654 .06142156 .00606017 .12825101   
Corruption Commission -.0358237 -.00292518 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) .03288198   
 .03249206 .02844796    .02682027   
State Fragility Index -.0001533 -.00808011 .00381012 -.00412939 -.00017507 -.00444376   
 .0035576 .00692891 .00589261 .00409547 .00086334 .01141941   
Transparency Index **.00218696 -.00184254 .00066096 *.0029531 .00008206 .0010168   
 .0010236 .00304421 .00181188 .00148626 .000291 .00175782   
Economic Globalization -.00103866 -.00294763 **-.00268671 ***-.00360829 .00009125 .00074077   
 .00104396 .00214098 .00117547 .00107037 .00055619 .00178804   
Proportion in Women Parliament -.00174214 .00004257 **.00641206 **-.00494588 .00020353 -.00131129   
 .0012406 .00070767 .00219234 .00239088 .00036636 .00181467   
Gender Equality *.21128146 .18233302 **-.68900085 0.41191448 -.00895544 .23882326   
 .1075318 .25301458 .27329301 .20985747 .00836225 .36518409   
Direct Democracy **-.16414327 ***-.23828973 .1454345 **-.3872214 -.00452607 -.18638251   
 .07624489 .08158654 .11302529 .17430208 .00958084 .18406628   
Print/Broadcasting Censorship .06162227 .14888497 .26490439 **.30453642 .05760282 *-.35534983   
 .10485691 .08748688 .23200354 .11541717 .07067297 .19205942   
Monarchy .00008813 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -.02066581   
 .04877841     .05137481   
Constant .21241789 ***.86733484 -.02651548 -.31051358 ***.81533402 -.06770798   
Lag3_tre -.00262098 .01960121 -.04299857 .00940607 .00300864 -.02564697   
 .00732408 .0171092 .02629414 .01181348 .00232164 .01507608   
Lag2_tre -.00243175 .02414991 -.03858578 .01603764 .00343981 -.0260637   
 .00860973 .01703767 .022974 .01306899 .00242705 .01930541   
Lag_tre -.00067612 .02656238 -.00985808 .00098805 .00166736 -.03075505   
 .00890171 .01831311 .02697866 .01428704 .00168705 .02078196   
tre .0022408 .02730159 .00214102 -.00849752 .00196673 -.02462421   
 .00974682 .02146459 .02495746 .01474341 .00194019 .02129907   
Lead_tre .00619517 .01746884 -.00949512 -.00228786 .0052658 -.0433749   
 .01101274 .02059534 .02188208 .01374307 .00382912 .02812818   
Lead2_tre .00215817 .014475 -.00823063 .0133299 .00283258 *-.05031121   
 .00973016 .01643832 .02451635 .01327469 .00235633 .02677848   
Lead3_tre -.00200338 .00875465 .00733357 .00134394 .00374039 -.03708731   
 .00983328 .01553439 .01751005 .01516114 .00267182 .02129729   
Lead4_tre .0029444 .01032052 .00784165 .0020763 .00413798 *-.04316085   
 .00989962 .01547288 .019492 .01396858 .00343181 .02188959   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table-8: Judicial Corruption 









Variable  All Countries  Latin America  NA_ME.  Sub-Saharan Africa  WE_NA Asia 
Lagged Judicial Corruption *-.00704924 -.00156215 -.00324384 -.00643803 .00020254 .00021527 
 .00369637 .00594963 .00412452 .00819607 .00139402 .00638097 
Judicial Independence ***.4013156 ***.50314846 .03349701 ***.39096542 .02381351 ***.3995321 
 .05473787 .11001445 .1495298 .10996088 .02215973 .07941251 
Predictability of Enforcement ***.22872648 .14814789 .16998669 *.26903603 .00053311 -.04648318 
 .08414634 .1163265 .21083579 .14285116 .01763653 .14117044 
Inflation .00007099 .00019924 .00026436 ***.00026915 .00018213 .00033962 
 .00005362 .00014095 .00020916 .00004534 .00030638 .00019546 
School Enrollment ***.00051832 -.00031535 .00046748 **.00046313 .000049 -.00019687 
 .00018244 .00036048 .00047375 .0001869 .00011705 .00053827 
Official Development Assistance -2,69E-09 1,26E-09 1,61E-09 -2,99E-09  -6,25E-09 
 1,97E-09 2,31E-08 3,40E-09 2,72E-09  3,71E-09 
Central Bank Independence -.02748905 ***-.08731537 *-.04077595 -.0036338 .00240579 .02727152 
 .0168201 .02924771 .01954511 .03614593 .0020414 .04276396 
Corruption Commission -.00215212 .00720732 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) .00395626 
 .0063755 .0079682    .01062626 
State Fragility Index -.00159143 -.00422077 .00133913 *-.00301135 .00097882 .00256248 
 .00096999 .00219819 .00170754 .00177058 .00076834 .00260034 
Transparency Index .00019179 .00081389 ***-.00110552 .00061633 .00028812 .00018519 
 .00039652 .00070636 .00035951 .00063998 .00017249 .00055307 
Economic Globalization -.00040643 .00005146 *.00126511 -.00031176 .00007671 -.00062743 
 .00035784 .00049301 .00071015 .00042341 .00017524 .0007448 
Media Corrupt .00598465 -.01012308 .00036126 .03370697 .01100437 .00102907 
 .00841224 .01569696 .00767073 .01994357 .01080693 .00894694 
FDI-in **-.00054627 *-.00116187 -.00021327 -.00040019 .00003811 *-.00169468 
 .00026568 .00055926 .0003766 .00024764 .00002678 .00083717 
Gender Equality .07404842 *-.08568649 **.23709528 -.00020773 .00840272 .09385338 
 .04524135 .04370158 .10949967 .0819388 .0123841 .17016299 
Direct Democracy .03115336 *.0562546 .02412226 .06555178 .01447675 ***-.15815505 
 .01902807 .02764628 .04787734 .04168788 .01309753 .05009455 
Election Free and Fair -.01355496 **-.05846416 -.00847739 -.00659485 -.0130621 -.01876054 
 .01885221 .0249184 .0084968 .02289386 .01248386 .01828203 
Print/Broadcasting Censorship -.04990798 .00328994 .093306 **-.13991746 .00817919 .04636972 
 .04036132 .05134647 .05360702 .06407741 .0128599 .05059598 
Public Sector Corrupt Exchange .01345413 -.00433472 -.01272859 .00023867 .00040455 .06581375 
 .0287986 .0245068 .03109335 .0420654 .01766685 .04031625 
Constant **.09475593 ***.31427451 .1844777 .05574017 ***.7260436 *.15744812 
Lag3_tre *-.00642861 .00156763 -.00206969 -.00517012 -.00020069 -.00220265 
 .0034515 .00517734 .0027066 .00756512 .00065899 .00557435 
Lag2_tre **-.00887763 -.00165729 -.00314869 -.00833008 -.00018959 -.00308573 
 .004391 .004946 .00265931 .00865935 .0007919 .00735746 
Lag_tre -.00492504 -.00061847 -.00308857 -.00243375 -.00077094 .00396193 
 .00461599 .00518645 .00344593 .01039232 .00069806 .00685463 
tre -.00166041 .00732052 -.00719684 -.00065164 -.00084176 -.00001283 
 .00451114 .00554283 .00526645 .00862328 .00076717 .01004999 
Lead_tre -.00137468 .00452774 -.00444355 .00075633 -.00480648 .00673032 
 .00486475 .00582107 .00529344 .00997009 .00394278 .01132608 
Lead2_tre -.00005508 .00778489 -.00515911 .00061314 -.00465588 .00797892 
 .00486452 .00675791 .00561512 .00892611 .00380253 .0110582 
Lead3_tre -.00359911 .0054188 *-.00887537 -.00325169 -.00188273 .00638316 
 .00525337 .00676844 .0050234 .00890368 .00142828 .01254899 
Lead4_tre .00196296 .00867035 -.01101508 .00092743 -.00007309 .02338027 
 .00555723 .00657679 .00706586 .00914883 .00135275 .01466921 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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